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Introduction:
September 11 and the Second Wave of Public Law Globalization:
The New Legal Infrastructure of Anti-Constitutionalism
After September 11, pundits pronounced that “everything had changed.”

The Bush

Administration insisted that a new war – a “global war on terror (GWOT) – was launched with the
attacks. Two literal wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, marked this new state of international conflict;
metaphorical wars were launched around the world as well in response to September 11. The new state of
belligerence has been invoked to justify changes in executive power, in surveillance policies, in the uses
of the military, in the system of transnational cooperation of security services. This has been true not just
in the US, which was the nation literally attacked, but in a growing archipelago of places, as country after
country has found itself either a target of terrorists, or a producer of them, or both. September 11 was not
simply an American event, but an international watershed, and the laws and policies of countries around
the world have changed in response.
But how substantial are these changes? Five years on, how much have the basic underpinnings of
the transnational legal world shifted?

Have we witnessed temporary adjustments to take into account a

transitory international emergency or are we in the midst of more structural and permanent adjustment?
In this book, I will argue that the changes we have witnessed since September 11 reach farther
than we might have imagined, are structural in nature, and implicate the ability of constitutional regimes
around the world to function as such. If observers have missed the extraordinary nature of the shift in the
world order, it is because it has occurred on terrain that is not terribly visible to the journalists, pundits
and political analysts who write the first draft of our history of the present.

They have been more

concerned with the personalities of specific leaders and the physical skirmishes in the conflict than with
the cognitive and structural nature of the adjustments. As a result, they have failed to see what is truly
radical about the post-September-11 world, which is a change in the legal bases of state action. Among
lawyers who focus on either international law or domestic constitutional law, but typically not both, the
extent of the changes is also largely hidden, because it occurs in the interstices between the two legal
specialties.
The fundamental changes that have occurred since September 11 both articulate a new
relationship between international and domestic law and also mark the declining hegemony of
constitutionalist ideas among political elites. The primary marker of these changes is the increased
abilities of national executives to use the cover of international law to undermine domestic constitutions
at home. While this has not happened in every country, it has happened in a surprising range of states
after September 11, including many states that have little or nothing to do with the front lines of the
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From once-again-powerful Russia to tiny Vanuatu, from constitutionalist Britain to anti-

constitutionalist Vietnam, countries around the world have been changing their laws and practices since
September 11 to fight terrorism, using a template that has been internationally forged, transnationally
transmitted through international and regional associations, and locally adjusted to produce results that
challenge basic constitutionalist principles at home.
While the substance of these changes is new, the use of international law as a basis for promoting
domestic legal change is not. Public international law, especially since World War II, has had an
immense influence on the development of domestic constitutionalism around the world.

The

development and spread of international human rights law is part of what we might call the “first wave of
public law globalization,” and it has had a substantial effect on constitutional drafters, newly empowered
constitutional courts and elite opinion, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s as first Southern Europe and
then Latin America and then post-communist Europe entered the field of constitutional democratic states.
Political coalitions in these places rallied around principles proclaiming the importance of parliamentary
power, judicial independence and respect for human rights, principles articulated through international
law debates and carried through transnational networks.
Since September 11, however, we have been witnessing the development of international security
law, which constitutes a second wave of public law globalization, modeled on the first in the way it
harnesses transnational organizations as a vector of change in diverse local settings. In this new wave,
national executives are empowered relative to local parliaments and courts; security services and police
are linked across countries more tightly than they are linked to bodies that might supervise them within
their own states; and surveillance and control of local populations are elevated above legal transparency
and the individuation of suspicion as principles organizing the relationship of the state to the individual.
The development of this international security law after September 11 follows a pattern of adoption we
already know well from the first wave of public law globalization even though its substance is quite
different.
How does this influence of international law on domestic law take place?

In the first wave of

public law globalization, starting with World War II and continuing up through September 11,
international human rights law provided a major support system for the development of constitutionalism
around the world. The global human rights movement had given key domestic constituencies within a
variety of countries power in domestic constitution-making processes to ensure a prominent place for
rights and rights protection. Particularly in countries emerging from various forms of authoritarianism,
from military dictatorships and from other anti-democratic regimes, the support provided by the
international human rights community, backed by the power of international human rights law, has
enabled reformers (themselves often veterans of these transnational movements) to develop world-class
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constitutions with deep and effective protections for rights-starved populations. The most widely ratified
rights conventions – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – often worked their
way directly into the wording of new constitutions as newly liberated populations came out from under
repressive governments. Understandings of international monitoring bodies and transnational courts
about the meaning and reach of rights have been influential sources for new constitutionalists in
animating rights within polities newly emerged from histories of abuse. Transnationally minded judges
and legal scholars have developed conversations across national borders about what rights should mean
and these conversations have developed into a transnational network of constitutional monitoring bodies
(constitutional courts, human rights commissioners, national ombudspersons) that look beyond national
borders for inspiration. This is a model animated by respect for human dignity, filled in by a dense set of
rights guarantees, and presided over by an active judiciary that ensures that states do not stray from the
path of effective rights protection. The new constitutionalism that the world has witnessed in the period
between the end of World War II and September 11 (speeded at the end of the Cold War) would have
been impossible were it not for the transnational coordination provided through the instruments,
institutions and activists of public international law.

Of course, the reality of this rights-respecting

revolution has fallen far short of the aspiration, but there can be no doubt that the transnational human
rights movement had a large effect on the new blueprints of government and has moved newly democratic
governments in the direction of increased human rights protections.
The international struggle against terrorism, given additional power after September 11, has
launched a second wave of public law globalization that pushes, substantively speaking, in the opposite
direction from the first wave. The anti-terrorism campaign (for this is a better metaphor than war) is led
from the security side of public international law through the United Nations Security Council and is
potentially backed with sanctions in a way that the human rights framework has not been.1 Since
September 11, the UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions that have been far more
legislative in character than anything the Security Council had previously passed.

Operating under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which makes resolutions binding on all member states and therefore
makes noncompliance at least theoretically subject to sanctions, the UN Security Council has required
states:

1

There are also 12 international treaties that fill in the UN framework for fighting terrorism. These have the virtue
of being clearly specified and the product of voluntary agreement among states. In what follows, I will be referring
more specifically to the new tendency of the UN Security Council to legislate in ways that leave vague mandates for
states to fill in with local content and also that impose onerous requirements to fight terrorism on countries that have
not been part of the Security Council debates.
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to create a separate crime of terrorism in their national laws (along with the crimes of conspiracy
to commit terrorism, aiding and abetting terrorism, providing material support for terrorism and
other ancillary offenses),

•

to monitor terrorist finances and to halt transfers of money to and from named parties as soon as
they appear on Security Council terrorism watch lists,

•

to act affirmatively to prevent terrorist plots from hatching on their territory and therefore to
increase the surveillance of and ability to gather information from domestic populations, and

•

to monitor the system of transnational travel, refugee claims and asylum applications to make
sure that terrorists are not moving around under cover of human-rights protections.2

Following this program has meant that states have created new, vague and politically defined crimes,
found ways around warrant-and-notice requirements before seizing property, launched massive new
domestic surveillance programs, moved toward preventive detention and aggressive interrogation, and put
up new barriers in the system of international migration.

All of these program, as we will see, have

implications for constitutionalism, separation of powers and the protection of human rights.
How has this happened?

Obviously, the passage of resolutions by the Security Council, even

under its Chapter VII powers, cannot bring such a security regime into being by itself. International law
famously has compliance problems. The human rights field has certainly been plagued by uneven
compliance, which is spotty at best among states prone toward mass violation and even weak in some
areas among constitutionalist states. But with international security law, states have rushed to adopt new
anti-terrorism laws with compliance levels that are extraordinary. Virtually all countries in the UN
system have responded to the Security Council’s anti-terrorism resolutions by changing their domestic
laws.3 Kofi Annan himself is quoted on the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee’s
website: “The work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the cooperation it has received from
Member States have been unprecedented and exemplary.”4
Why has there been such a rush to comply with international security law? I will argue that it is
because international security law has a different domestic constituency than the constituency for humanrights-based laws characteristic of the first wave of public law globalization. This time it is national
2

These four elements constitute the spine of the first and most sweeping resolution, Security Council Resolution
1373 (attached in the appendix to this summary).
3

Much of my book is based on reports that the 191 member states of the United Nations have submitted to the UN
Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee. For the national reports on which I base these claims, see
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html .
4

Id.
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executives (sometimes with and sometimes without legislative approval) who have moved swiftly to put
the new international security law into practice. Moreover, national executives adopt such policies
despite the effects that the new policies have on domestic constitutional structures and on the realization
of rights, precisely because these policies tend to bolster the power of national executives relative to
everyone else in their domestic political space. In fact, in countries where national executives were
chafing at the constraints imposed on their use of state power by the new human-rights-infused
constitutions and by new devices for sharing power adopted in the first wave of public law globalization,
the anti-terrorism campaign has been the device through which national executives have attempted to
loosen such constraints.

Transnational links among national executives, national militaries, national

police and national security agencies have been strengthened with the anti-terrorism campaign and links
between national executives and their own domestic parliaments and courts have been attenuated.

In

short, so many countries have complied so quickly with the new international security law because the
very national executives who have pushed along these changes also have a strong interest in gaining the
power that this new legal regime gives them relative to the other players in their own domestic space.
The post-September-11 world, then, has provided these national executives with a way to
empower themselves relative to the judges, non-governmental organizations advocating human rights,
and disadvantaged constituencies who pushed along the last wave of public law globalization. But given
that judges and human rights activists in particular used the high-minded rhetoric of “following
international law” as one of the bases for their prior success, it is difficult for them to challenge the same
rhetoric used now toward different ends.

Countries that have altered their laws and legal frameworks

after September 11 have often justified the changes by pointing to the wisdom and even necessity of
following international law.

But the international law invoked in the post-September-11 world has

entirely different content than that invoked by international human rights supporters in the period of postWorld-War-II constitution building. The two realms of international law and constitutional law may
therefore not continue to be mutually reinforcing and compatible, as they have generally been when the
relevant international law was the human rights law that supported and protected domestic constitutional
rights provisions. In the anti-terrorism campaign, the new international public law seems primarily to
provide the conditions for undermining domestic constitutional law, particularly its concern for balanced
and checked constitutional powers, for human rights and for due process. Countries that are new to the
world of constitutionalized and democratically constrained political power are the most fragile of all,
though established constitutional states that have remained relatively isolated in the first wave of public
law globalization from the transnational constitutional movement are also vulnerable.

Non-robust

constitutional states are often precisely the ones most pressured to do whatever it takes to fight terrorism.
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How can we understand more globally what has happened as a result of the development and
spread of international security law after September 11? I advance the idea of the international state of
emergency (ISOE) as a way to understand the package of legal changes that have swept the world after
the attacks on the US. Under new transnational legal pressures, states around the world have moved
toward using emergency powers domestically to fight terrorism internationally.

Calling what has

happened in many places a “state of emergency” may sound like fighting words to some, but in this book
(see Chapter 2 below), I develop an analytic conception of a state of emergency so that it is a regime type
defined by clear features and not a term of abuse.

As I will argue, the fact that few states declared

formal states of emergency after September 11 should not hide the fact that emergency powers that
explicitly or implicitly suspend constitutional principles are being used widely to fight terrorism.
I also want to rethink the very idea of a state of emergency to allow us to place emergencies in an
international context and not just in a purely national frame. In the existing legal literature, states of
emergency are imagined as purely national legal states that have no parallel in international law. And, in
fact, one of the main ways in which emergencies end is that the “international community” brings
pressures to bear on those states whose emergencies exceed the duration and depth of their threats. But, I
argue (particularly in Chapter 3), we cannot understand what has happened since September 11 until we
can see both international and domestic law together in thinking about the slide into emergency powers.
Given international law’s complicity in this slide, it is no longer available in the same way to give
resistant communities within states under emergency a hand in throwing off emergency powers. Instead,
international law provides the excuse, and also some of the resources, for maintaining emergency powers
longer in many states.

This new development needs to be taken on board in rethinking what states of

emergency are, how they function, and how they might be brought to an end.
My purpose in this book (and in this abstract of the book) is to attempt a description of a new
world order that has emerged since September 11 and, by describing it, to allow us all to get our minds
around the fundamental changes that the addition of international security law makes to the toolbox
containing other forms of international law.

In particular, international law can now be used to

undermine domestic constitutional structures as well as to bolster and protect them.
Along the way, I will show that a number of commonplaces about the relationship between
international and domestic law are not true, at least not in the context of the anti-terror campaign. For
example, many presume that countries are either generally favorable or generally hostile to public
international law. Taking one’s international legal obligations seriously is something that comes with a
particular legal culture. Weak legal cultures may have only hollow commitments to obligations they
have undertaken.

Strong legal cultures, by contrast, take law seriously and only sign on to those
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In short, the general view is either that international law is

taken seriously or it is not by a particular country.
As I will show in this book, however,5 the very states that took the first wave of public law
globalization seriously and built strong, transnationally backed protections into their constitutional orders
are the very states whose compliance with the second wave of public international law has been most
spotty, and the states that were most resistant to the pressures from the first wave of international public
law globalization have been most eager to adopt the most extreme forms of compliance with the second
wave of public international law globalization.

In short, countries that aligned their constitutional orders

with transnational support for human rights have been the slowest to respond to international security law
and vice versa.

The countries most loudly proclaiming the value of international public law now are

precisely the ones who sat out the first round of public law globalization.
In addition, most have assumed that strengthening regimes of international law necessarily
weakens domestic law.

Becoming increasingly bound by international law undercuts domestic

sovereignty because it lodges the creation of norms in external bodies. But, after September 11, we can
see that this, too, is not universally true. Instead, in the post-September 11 world, both transnational and
national institutions have increased their powers by working together in a concerted way.

As a result,

many national governments (though, significantly not all) have found new powers to exercise control over
their own populations, at the same time as transnational institutions have expanded their reach and power.
The compliance with Security Council resolutions in the area of international security has strengthened
both the Security Council in this area, and also the absolute power of national executives, who are the
often the ones more fervently claiming their adherence to nationalist rationales.
How have these major changes since September 11 concretely occurred? In this new legal
framework, international institutions have set mandatory but general legal parameters for combating
terrorism, and national governments have tailored those international mandates to fit their local political
and security situations. International and transnational organizations ranging from the UN Security
Council (first and foremost) to the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN) have spoken with a
nearly uniform voice on what is required to eradicate terrorism; countries that are member-states of these
organizations have been called upon to participate in an international struggle against terrorism by
adjusting their domestic laws to comply. As a result, the anti-terrorism campaign is being waged using a
series of domestic legal responses coordinated through international mechanisms.
5

The most serious demonstration of this assertion comes with the case studies elaborated in Part II of the book. In
each chapter in Part II, a country that was a major participant in the first wave of public law globalization is paired
with a similar country that was not part of the first wave, and then their post-September-11 policies are compared.
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Transnational institutions have found new powers after September 11 because they have
responded to requests from terrorist-target countries to use their capacities to bring other states into line,
particularly those states that have been diagnosed as the producers of terrorism. As a result, more powers
have been ceded by the powerful states to transnational institutions to play an active role in the antiterrorism campaign, precisely because those institutions are doing the bidding of terrorist-target states.
But then member states on the receiving end of the mandates from transnational bodies, particularly from
the UN Security Council, have been able to use the very fact that they have been commanded by these
transnational bodies as a justification for convincing their own reluctant domestic populations that new
laws must be passed to comply with international law. As it turns out, this increases both the power of
the national government currently in power (or, at least, the executives within current national
governments) and also the power of the international institutions at the same time.
In short, transnational institutions are being used by powerful countries like the United States to
direct other states to take particular approaches in fighting terrorism. And those downstream states often
grab at the chance to “follow international law” because it empowers whomever happens to be in power
at the time in each state. Domestic leaders in many countries, seeing it in their interest to “follow
international law” when it would have been much harder for them either to publicly cave in to direct
pressure from the United States or to take these steps on their own initiative, have then used the leverage
that the international mandates give them to increase their own domestic powers to carry out what the
transnational institutions have asked them to do.
For example, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, on the verge of permitting national
elections to replace his military government when the attacks of September 11, 2001 hit, has since
engineered a series of constitutional amendments to give the military a more permanent role in the
Pakistani government. He has, of course, shown no signs of stepping down, as he had originally pledged.
President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia has similarly pushed through a series of emergency laws and
constitutional amendments, including one that allowed him to run for more terms of office than the
Constitution had originally permitted – all in the name of fighting terrorism. President Vladimir Putin of
Russia has changed the structure of the Russian government so that now the president can appoint
regional governors and so that now all members of the parliament must be elected on party tickets,
eliminating single-member districts that had been the primary way that independent voices had gotten into
the Duma. This, too, is billed as part of a campaign against terrorism. Tony Blair used a great deal of his
political capital to get through the Parliament draconian anti-terrorism laws that give virtually
untrammeled powers to government ministers, including a new “Civil Contingencies Act” (read: state of
emergency law) that allows any minister to declare a state of emergency and then to proceed by
“executive legislation.” The international community, which has an interest in tough terrorism tactics,
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has hardly objected to any of these policies, and the governments in question have proudly reported these
changes in their laws to the Security Council to prove that they are completely on board with the antiterror campaign. But each of these changes also happens to increase the powers of the primary national
executive relative to other potential domestic challengers, and one may reasonably suspect that this
provides an additional motivation to “follow international law.”
The specific things that Musharraf, Uribe, Putin and Blair have done are not commanded by the
UN Security Council, of course. But the Security Council’s resolutions (backed up by similar resolutions
of regional bodies) mandate general frameworks for taking aggressive steps against terrorism without
giving specific instructions on tactics. The local leaders adapt these general mandates to their specific
situations and design concrete strategies that will carry out the general program. Musharraf, Uribe, Putin
and Blair may have adopted strategies are not the most preferred ones, in the view of the Security Council
or of the Security Council staff enforcing the resolutions. But when power-hungry leaders take the hardline strategies that they have in the name of fighting terrorism, the Security Council has not given itself
much of a basis for complaining.6
The diversity of national responses to the requirements set by international institutions disguises
the fact that the national responses are all in fact framed as responses to the same stimuli – the
international framework for fighting Islamic terrorism.

This mixed structure of the anti-terrorism

campaign (partly international, partly domestic – and therefore diverse in specifics while general in
justification and goals) has made it hard for most legal analysts to see its logic. The anti-terrorism
campaign is neither a purely transnational campaign nor a purely domestic one. The shape of the threat
and the nature of the program to fight it are promulgated and monitored by international organizations
while the design of concrete strategies, as well as their implementation and regulation, are domestic. The
end result has been an increase in the power of transnational bodies and an increase in the power of
domestic governments at the same time.

6

Nor has it wanted to. The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council has explicitly disavowed that it
will use international human rights law to assess the changes that member states are making. As the CTC website
still says:
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).
Monitoring performance against other international conventions, including human rights law, is outside the
scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee's mandate. But we will remain aware of the interaction with
human rights concerns, and we will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate. It is, of course, open to other
organizations to study States' reports and take up their content in other forums.

http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/human_rights.html (visited 4 September 2006).
forums have sanction power, however.

None of these other

Scheppele – draft September 2006

10

International State of Emergency

How does this mixed structure work? On one hand, it is obvious that the anti-terrorism campaign
is global in scope. The network of terrorist organizations is clearly not limited by or contained within
state boundaries and its ability to launch spectacular attacks in places ranging from New York to Bali,
London to Baghdad marks it as truly global. In addition, the states that have joined together to fight this
network themselves comprise a transnational network of their own, coordinating across boundaries on
sharing intelligence, intercepting terror finances, even kidnapping and moving suspects around the globe
where they can be squeezed for information in places that have histories of using torture. So, both sides
of the fight – both terrorist networks and target-state networks – are linked across national boundaries.
This makes the fight against international terrorism global for both terrorists and governments, and both
sides have used their institutional resources to coordinate the global aspects of the campaign by building
up their networks.
On the other hand, however, the international fight against terrorism is conducted primarily
through the tools available to national governments – deploying security services under national control,
changing national legal regulation, and increasing national enforcement of national laws.

National

governments are doing most of the work, even as the work they do contributes to an internationally
coordinated campaign. So, for example, the perpetrators of the Bali bombing were tried in Indonesian
courts under Indonesian law.

The suspects in the Madrid bombings were investigated by Spanish

investigative magistrates and will be put on trial under Spanish law. Under domestic law, Britain detains
foreign nationals when it appears that those foreign nationals have been involved in transnational
terrorism networks. Looked at it in this way, the responses to terrorism appear to be national because the
campaign against terrorism is not conducted directly through international institutions and because
national law is on the front lines of the fight. But the Indonesian and Spanish and British laws (and the
anti-terrorism laws of virtually all countries in the world at the moment) were drafted in response to
international legal mandates. And, in each case, the laws push the envelope of constitutionality in the
country in question.7 The responses to terrorism may look purely domestic, but they are transnational in
crucial ways.
One might reasonably ask what has become of sovereignty in this matrix of anxieties, attacks and
counter-attacks, responses and counter-responses.

7

Just as there is a mixed picture with regard to law,

A decision of the Indonesian Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the law under which one of the Bali
bombers had been tried, because it was passed after the bombings and had retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the
convicted bomber is still in prison. The Spanish system of incommunicado detention of terrorism suspects has long
been a subject of criticism by European human rights monitors and yet it is still in use. In December 2004, the
British system of preventive detention of alien terrorism suspects was determined by the Law Lords to be in conflict
with the Human Rights Act. The Parliament re-passed the law eliminating the objectionable discrimination against
aliens by making both aliens and nationals subject to preventive detention on the say-so of the Home Secretary.
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where international and domestic law are bolstering each other, the results for sovereignty are mixed too.
As I will show in the case studies in Part II of this book, the new international security law that has
developed since September 11 has as its primary domestic effects empowering national executives
relative to the other branches of national governments and disabling the domestic institutions of rights
enforcement and procedural protection.

In powerful countries in particular, international law bolsters

national presidents, prime ministers, chancellors and other top executives who themselves often use
nationalist rhetoric and strategies for fighting terrorism. In that way, the transnational legal changes after
September 11 support an aggressively nationalist appeal to sovereignty in general and to the power of
chief executives in particular. But, if a state is weak relative to the rest of the world system and is also
the object of intense interest by more powerful states, then the very same executive aggrandizement and
nationalist justification going on there mean something different. National executives of these terrorimplicated weak states become hostages to the transnational terrorism campaign because they are under
pressure to get on board with the international program, particularly when they are on the front lines of
terrorism. The very same legal developments that give Bush, Blair, Merkel, Berlusconi (before he was
ousted by the voters) and Putin more power at home as well as more power to shape the transnational
terrorism strategy also make Musharraf, Karzai, Yudhoyono, and al-Maliki more susceptible to being
used by more powerful states for their own purposes. But Musharraf, Karzai, Yudhoyono, and al-Maliki
are also able to consolidate more control within their own states, to take on near-dictatorial powers and to
appeal to national self-interest in doing so, because what they are doing is part of the transnational antiterrorism strategy to which they are yoked. Executives in terrorist-target strong countries as well as those
in terror-implicated weak states are all increasing their powers in the anti-terrorism campaign, even as
more powerful states use transnational institutions to further dominate weaker states.
Along the way, however, since transnational institutions like the UN and corresponding regional
organizations are the ones developing and promulgating the programs that all countries are supposed to
follow, transnational institutions increase their power as well. Powerful states have chosen to work
through transnational institutions precisely to hide the origins of the pressures they are placing on weak
states. As a result, the UN Security Council – to take the central transnational organization in this
campaign – has been given a new and powerful role after 9/11.

Its new powers come along with the

increase in the powers of the powerful states, not at their expense. Political power is therefore not a zerosum game, but can be increased all around in times of trouble.
In this anti-terrorism campaign, then, international and domestic law are revealed as two
interdependent systems that each shape and influence the other – a marble cake of laws. While this is
nothing new as a formal matter – both international human rights law and international trade law have
long tied domestic and international law together in roughly the same way before – it is new as a
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substantive matter because international security law implicates core issues of national sovereignty and
security in ways that the other branches of law did not. International norms in this area have bolstered
national power to accomplish international purposes; domestic legal structures have provided the actual
sites and many of the resources for the struggle against terrorism. As a result, the apparently universal
anti-terrorism strategy has come to include a variety of local peculiarities.
On the domestic law side, the anti-terrorism campaign has in many places weakened the ability of
domestic constitutions to restrain state leaders, particularly those state leaders who find the mandated
emergency provisions not only instrumental in achieving the desired international purposes, but also
convenient for accomplishing locally controversial projects under cover of international approval. So, for
example, new laws regulating states of emergency have been passed in Britain, Iraq, Pakistan and
elsewhere; governmental structures have been modified in Russia and Colombia. But all of the changes
point in the same direction: they give the executives of these states far more powers than they ever had
before.
In the international arena, the effect has been to bring a variety of purely local struggles into the
purview of international anti-terrorism policy, with a subsequent enlargement of the anti-terrorism policy
to terrorist and even merely dissident groups of far less than “global reach.” To get China on board, many
states (the US lead among them) dutifully classified the formerly “freedom-fighting” Muslim Uighurs as
terrorists, and Russia was able to get Chechen nationalists (including some who had been duly elected by
the population of Chechnya) into that category as well. These previously local fights have, as a result,
become part of the global anti-terrorism campaign. The anti-terrorism campaign is now a comprehensive
international frame, much as the Cold War was, through which virtually all local disputes become linked
in a broader calculus of interest that implicates the international community.
In some of its most worrying manifestations, the new international security law has encouraged
national executives to invoke pre-existing or new-fangled domestic emergency powers in the name of
fighting global terrorism. In many states around the world, for example, national executives are freezing
the assets of suspected terrorists with no accompanying judicial procedure. Surveillance of domestic
populations has been increased, generally without a public debate about the extent of these measures or of
the need for them. And there is generally little public accountability in how the new measures are being
deployed. Security services have been mobilized to “disappear” suspected terrorists or at least to look the
other way while residents on their territory are disappeared by the security services of other states.
Suspected terrorists are then whisked into an international gulag of interrogation centers, but with the
active knowledge and participation of domestic intelligence agencies, including in states that otherwise
pride themselves on their commitments to the rule of law.

National parliaments and courts are being

bypassed as executives deal directly with international bodies in the anti-terrorism campaign under legal
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frameworks that were once designed merely for the uncontroversial implementation of Security Council
resolutions in domestic law.
The use of emergency powers has been widespread enough that one can say, without
exaggeration, that constitutional systems specifically and the principles of constitutionalism generally are
under challenge around the world.

But whereas, before September 11, there might have been pressure

from the international community for states invoking emergency powers to return to normal governance,
these uses of emergency powers, after September 11, are part of a transnational campaign that the
international community (read: powerful states) has no interest in stopping.

As a result, the persistent

international criticism that once came when states went off the deep end into emergency government is no
longer forthcoming.
In showing how these changes have occurred around the world, I have written a book both about
what has concretely occurred since September 11, and about the ways in which different registers of law –
the international and the domestic, the exceptionalist and the constitutionalist – intersect, conflict and
change. But this is a book with a very particular field of vision. I am focusing here on legal changes, on
the formal legal rationales for actions taken in the anti-terrorism campaign and on their actual legal
effects.

As a result, many of the most important and dramatic events – the fall of the Towers, the

campaigns in Tora Bora and Fallujah, the explosions in Bali and Madrid and London and Mumbai, the
horror of Beslan, the mysterious whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, the franchising of terrorist activity
around the world – will fall to the edge of our analysis except insofar as they animate legal changes. The
matrix of terrorist attacks and the military responses to them by the “coalitions of the willing” power the
anti-terrorism campaign and create real casualties and tragedies. But my concern in this book is with the
way in which states understand their strategies for fighting the anti-terrorism campaign as a legal matter
off the public battlefields.

So while the dramatic events that constitute the front line of terrorist attack

and anti-terrorist counter attack are in a very real way at issue in this book, I will see them through the
peculiar lens of the law.
Why concentrate so much on law?

While those of us who have studied law empirically have

always counseled that no one should ever mistake a statute for reality, it does matter a great deal how
states engage formal legality when they address a crisis. The days of absolutist kings are gone, or at least
so we might have thought; four hundred years of struggle have established the principle in much of the
world that states should be governed by law, by separated powers, and with a concern for the rights of
individuals. The rule of law can be seen, as E.P. Thompson surprisingly declared a couple of decades
ago, as an “unqualified human good.”8 While law never lives up to its own advance billing and while
8

E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975).

Scheppele – draft September 2006

14

International State of Emergency

there is much unjust law in the world, states that deliberately escape from the constraints of
constitutionalism are virtually always dangerous and disastrous. Since September 11, we are faced with
the very real situation in which states are justifying the breakdown of constitutional frameworks to fight
an enemy defined in no clear way.

So law matters, even while it does not matter absolutely. I write this

book with a healthy sense of skepticism about what law can do in fighting for justice – but also with a
certain amount of respect for what it can do to prevent horrors as well.
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PART I: FRAMEWORKS
Chapter 1: Lawscapes After September 119

September 11 was a political event, a traumatic event, a tragic event – and a legal event. After
September 11, the US quickly enacted the USA PATRIOT Act and instituted other legal changes that
involved both aggressive reinterpretation of existing law as well as extraordinary assertions of executive
power. But nearly every country in the world also changed its laws in some way to respond to the new
world after September 11, and most did so – at a minimum – in ways that tracked in some detail the
program of the USA PATRIOT Act. Why did reactions to September 11 take such a generally uniform
response in country after country? Why, for example, did Vanuatu pass a general anti-terrorism law that
looked virtually identical to the one that the UK passed? And why did the UK’s law so closely track the
USA PATRIOT Act? Why were elements of the US anti-terrorism program after September 11 popping
up in places ranging from Indonesia to Russia, from India to Italy?
What we need in order to see what has happened is a “lawscape” – a picture of the major
elements of the legal terrain so that one see how political events are located against the background of
law.

The lawscape shown here goes beyond one country’s legal changes to highlight the

interdependence of legal adaptation in the anti-terrorism campaign around the world.
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 provided the framework for much post-September-11 legal
activity. More legislative in character than anything that the Security Council had previously attempted,
Resolution 1373 (and other resolutions like 1390 and 1456) invoked the Security Council’s Chapter VII
authority under the United Nations Charter, meaning that the resolution was legally binding on all 191
member states of the UN. It passed the Security Council unanimously on September 28, 2001 at UN
Headquarters in New York City, while the still-smoldering ruins of the World Trade Center were only a
few miles away. Resolution 1373 was apparently introduced at the behest of the US government (though
this is not in the official record) and it passed unanimously without any recorded debate.10
Most UN Security Council resolutions before 1373 had not looked like general laws, but instead
like one-shot orders of some specificity. For example, a Security Council resolution might forbid all UN

9

Parts of this chapter will appear as Kim Lane Scheppele, The Migration of Anti-Constitutional Ideas: The Post9/11 Globalization of Public Law and the International State of Emergency. Forthcoming in THE MIGRATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (ED. SUJIT CHOUDHRY) (Oxford University Press, 2006).
10

The public session debating and adopting the resolution lasted from 9:55 pm until 10 pm on Friday, 28 September
2001.
The entirety of the public record on the debate over Resolution 1373 can be found at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N01/557/31/PDF/N0155731.pdf?OpenElement .
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member states from selling weapons to a particular country, or might caution a particular state not to take
certain steps. A Security Council resolution might condemn a particular course of action by a member
state and require that state reverse it, or it might establish trade embargoes against particular states for
particular reasons.11 Resolution 1373 was different. (See Appendix A for the text of Resolution 1373.)
Resolution 1373 required all states to change their domestic laws in very particular ways. As a
result, it looked more like general legislation than like a typical Security Council resolution.

As

international law scholars who have followed the Security Council have noted, Resolution 1373 meant
that “the Security Council starts legislating.”12 Paul Szasz observed:

With its recent resolution to counter the treat of terrorism, the United Nations Security Council
broke new ground by using, for the first time, its Chapter VII powers under the Charter to order
all states to take or refrain from specified actions in a context not limited to disciplining a
particular country.

It has long been accepted that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)

cannot legislate international law.13

But, as Szasz then went on to say, in this case the Security Council did just that.
What did Resolution 1373 require of states?14 The most crucial parts mandated four sorts of
changes in domestic law, including laws that would:
1. criminalize terrorism as a separate offense (along with associated crimes of attempt,
conspiracy and material support) in national criminal codes, with harsher punishments
attached to terrorism-related offenses than common crimes.
2. disrupt terrorism financing within and between countries, demanding that states develop
strategies for immediately freezing the assets of anyone suspected of terrorist activity.
3. detect terrorists and their plots before such plots could materialize, through the development
of new strategies for uncovering information about these plots and through sharing
information so acquired across agencies within a government and across national boundaries.
11

See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004) for an
extensive analysis of the Security Council’s resolutions passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
12

Paul Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating. 96 A.S.I.L. 901 (2002).

13

Id. at 901.

14

The set of requirements listed here come not just from the resolution itself, but from my analysis of questions and
pressures that the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council put to states as they developed their
reports on compliance.
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4. crack down on the flow of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers so that terrorists could not
use the system of legal transnational migration to aid their plotting and to carry out their
attacks.

But this framework omitted two crucial pieces that it might have been wise to include:
1. The Security Council provided no definition of terrorism, leaving states to define terrorism
however they saw fit15 and
2. The Security Council explicitly disavowed any responsibility to monitor the human rights
violations that might come with the enforcement of this plan.16

Along with these specific requirements, the Security Council also created a Counter-Terrorism
Committee (CTC) in order to track national compliance with these directives and to intervene
aggressively in responding to the national reports that countries were required to submit that indicated
what they had done to fight terrorism. The CTC has been instructed to push countries toward compliance
with the Security Council anti-terrorism campaign.
Regional organizations – the European Union,17 the African Union,18 the Organization of
American States,19 the Association of South-East Asian Nations,20 the Commonwealth of Nations21 and
15

For the lack of a common definition, see the
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/definition.html.

Counter-Terrorism

Committee

website

at

16

For the disavowal of a direct responsibility to monitor human rights compliance, see the Counter-Terrorism
Committee website at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/human_rights.html .

17

For the early actions of the European Union which included the development of a framework agreement for
defining terrorism, the speeding up of the creation of the transnational prosecutorial service and the encouragement
of cooperation among national security services, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts:
Europe’s Response to September 11. 50 LOYOLA LAW REVIEW 89-148 (2004) at 105-109.

18

The African Union adopted a Plan of Action on September 14, 2001, a plan designed to establish an anti-terrorism
framework for cooperation among member states and to encourage all member states to ratify the anti-terrorism
conventions. Once Security Council Resolution 1373 was adopted, the AU pledged to push the states in its region to
adopt the requirements of the resolution and also to promote the principles in the Convention on the Prevention and
Combating of Terrorism (Algiers Convention). For the text of the September 14 plan, see Plan of Action of the
African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, 14
September 2002, Doc. Mtg./HLIG/Conv.Terror/Plan. (I)

19

The OAS adopted a regional anti-terrorism convention after September 11. Inter-American Convention Against
Terrorism, adopted at the 32nd regular session of the OAS General Assembly, 3 June 2002, Doc. A-66. The text of
the convention can be found at http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGres1840_02.htm .
20

ASEAN expressed its support for Security Council Resolution 1373 and passed a resolution on 5 November 2001
to ensure that its member states complied with it.
For the text of the resolution, see
http://www.aseansec.org/10591.htm.
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the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,22 among others – jumped on the anti-terrorism
bandwagon with resolutions, framework decisions and action plans of their own. They endorsed Security
Council Resolution 1373 (and its successor resolutions that filled in this general system). They pledged
to promote compliance among their member states with the Security Council mandate.
And member states overwhelmingly complied – or at least appeared to. All of the member states
of the UN filed at least one compliance report with the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security
Council; many countries are now on their fourth and fifth reports since September 11. Virtually all of the
reports reveal that states have made changes in their laws to comply with the resolution.

In this chapter,

I provide an overview of some of the most common changes.23 In Part II of the book, I provide more
detailed case studies to show how precisely the anti-terror campaign was grafted onto existing law (and
undermined specific constitutional protections) in particular states.

a) Defining Terrorism

Despite initial resistance on the part of a number of countries to making terrorism a separate
offense in domestic criminal law, most countries have now amended their criminal codes to single out
terrorism for special treatment.

But such criminalization requires that the crime be defined, and this is

where the UN guidance ran out and domestic discretion began. In the absence of an agreed-upon
definition of terrorism, not surprisingly, states defined terrorism in ways that suited them.
Some states without substantial constitutional traditions defined terrorism to be virtually any
politically motivated challenge to the state, which almost entirely overlapped the field of political dissent.
For example, Vietnam defined a terrorist as anyone who “oppose(s) the people’s administration and

21

The Commonwealth established a Committee on Terrorism (CCT) to assist member states of the Commonwealth
to adopt all of the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1373. See also the Commonwealth Plan of Action,
29 January 2002, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=35145.

22

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) adopted a Decision and Action Plan on
Combating Terrorism pledging all member states to adopt all 12 UN conventions on terrorism as well as their
protocols and to implement all of their obligations under Security Council resolutions. OSCE, Decision on
Combating Terrorism and the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, 3-4 December 2001, Doc.
MC(9), DEC/1.

23

My analysis is based on country reports filed by member states of the United Nations to the UN Security
Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC); I also use news accounts, human rights reports and other countryspecific documents (e.g. texts of laws, parliamentary debates where available, local histories and so on). Nearly all
of the 191 reporting countries in the UN changed some features of their laws to respond to September 11.
Moreover, most of the changes were quite similar, reflecting a common template for such changes. And most
alarmingly, many of these changes involved substantial deviations from both international and domestic norms of
constitutional and democratic governance.
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infringe(s) upon the lives of officials, public employees or citizens.”24 In Brunei, a terrorist is “any
person who . . .by the use of any firearm, explosive, or ammunition acts in a manner prejudicial to public
safety or to the maintenance of public order or incites to violence or counsels disobedience to the law or
to any lawful order.”25 Clearly, these definitions sweep quite broadly over activities of which the state
may not approve, and so anti-terrorism campaign has the potential to sweep up local political
disagreement under the guise of fighting international terrorists.
In some countries, the motivation behind an allegedly terrorist act, if relevant, was to be proven
as for any ordinary crime. In other countries (like the United States, for example), terrorist motivation is
satisfied if the defendant “appears to be intended to” accomplish a terrorist goal.26 As a result, the mental
state required for determination of a criminal act is located in the mind of the observer rather than in the
mind of the criminal, something highly unusual in American law. In Canada, the new post-September-11
terrorism law created an offense of terrorism that required proof that the act was carried out “in whole or
in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause.”27 As Kent Roach has shown,
proof of motive is not customarily required in Canadian criminal law and criminalizing motive poses a
very real danger of infringing the very political, religious or ideological beliefs that would otherwise be
protected as matters of individual conscience or as subjects of free expression.28
Still other states criminalized terrorists while exempting freedom-fighters, tying the law to the
foreign policy of the state. This was true of a number of Arab states, who were eager to distinguish acts

24

As translated in the CTC report submitted by Vietnam, 31 January 2003, S/2003/128.

25

Brunei Darussalam, CTC Report, 14 June 2002, S/2002/682.

26

As used in this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2331 et seq.] -(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that-(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of
the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national
boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum. . .
50 U.S.C. §2331.
27

Bill C-36, 49-50 Eliz. II Part II.1.83.01 (1) (2001).

28

KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA (McGill-Queens University Press, 2003) at 25-28.
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designed to resist Israeli occupation from other violent attacks against state interests.29

Still other

countries dusted off old anti-subversion or anti-communist laws, crossing out “subversion” or
“communism” and substituting “terrorism” instead.30
Even France, after 9/11, instituted a new offense of “pimping for terrorism” by an Act of 18
March 2003.

31

This offense can be charged against anyone who fails to substantiate the source of

income that supports his or her lifestyle, when that person also is closely associated with others who are
suspected of engaging in terrorist acts. The assumption behind the law is that those with no accountable
means of support must have gotten their income from terrorist activity if they have terrorist associates.
The offense does not require demonstration that the charged person him- or herself has committed or
plans to commit terrorist acts. Anyone in the vicinity of a suspected terrorist with suspicious amounts of
money can be swept into this net.
So far as anyone can tell from the CTC’s reaction,32 it has not condemned any of these
definitions.

But it has tried to push countries that have not criminalized terrorism into doing so, even

over resistance. Mexico, for example, indicated in its first report to the CTC in 2001 that it could clearly
29

Yemen, to take one example, borrowed its definition of terrorism in its criminal code from the regional
convention, the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism:
Article 1 (2) Terrorism. Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the
advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people,
causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause
damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them,
or seeking to jeopardize national resources. . . .
Article 2 (a) All cases of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign occupation
and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance with the principles of international law,
shall not be regarded as an offence. This provision shall not apply to any act prejudicing the territorial
integrity of any Arab State.
Yemen CTC report 2 March 2002. Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998, part 1, translated at
http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/terrorism98.htm .
30

See Michael Richardson, Asian Regimes Appear to Use War on Terror to Stem Dissent, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov.
21, 2002
31

France, CTC Report, 29 March 2004, S/2004/226 at 16. The phrase “pimping for terrorism” is their translation of
their law.

32

We know from the CTC’s statements about its own procedures that it reviews each of these reports individually
and writes specific questions back to the country at issue. Sometimes it is possible to see what the CTC asked
because the country organizes its next report as answers to numbered questions. But while the CTC posts country
reports on its website, it does not post its own questions to that country on the website, so it is impossible to tell how
harsh the CTC is with countries that use the anti-terrorism campaign for purposes which are not necessarily those of
the CTC. Since some countries publish questions along with their answers, however, we can hazard a rough guess.
So far, the CTC does not seem to think any state has gone too far in fighting terrorism; all of the questions I have
seen push toward taking additional measures, not toward scaling back any taken thus far.
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handle all crimes that might amount to terrorism within its current criminal code without explicitly calling
terrorism a crime as such, especially if one took into account the provisions for conspiracy, aiding and
abetting, and criminal association.

But since Mexico was one of those few countries that reported the

CTC questions along with its answers in its later reports, we can see that the CTC specifically pressed
Mexico to criminalize “recruitment for the purposes of carrying out terrorist acts regardless of whether
such acts have actually been committed or attempted.”33 Mexico responded that such people could be
punished as accomplices under the current penal code.

By the time of the 2003 CTC report, however,

Mexico reports having criminalized the recruitment of members to terrorist groups. It also added the new
offenses of threats to commit terrorism, conspiracy to commit terrorism, and the concealment of terrorist
activities.34 This appears to be as clear an indication as any that Mexico was pressured by the CTC to do
this. We can also see in the CTC reports from Mexico that, in direct response to CTC request, Mexico
changed the minimum sentence for a terrorism-related offense from 2 years to 18 years.
The worry here is that vague and politically calculated definitions of terrorism endanger ordinary
political dissenters and allow the state to use the anti-terrorism campaign to go after domestic enemies
who may not be connected to the transnational anti-terror plots. Terrorism, however defined, always has
some irreducibly political element, and as a result, its criminalization will always pose challenges for
those who are engaged merely in boisterous dissent. The constitutional and human rights objections to
vague and politically defined crimes are well known, and the international anti-terrorism campaign has
provided the opportunity for many more states to criminalize politically engaged actions as terrorism.
And so far, the Counter-Terrorism Committee has seen no problems with overly zealous criminal antiterrorism laws.

b) Disrupting Terrorism Financing

Perhaps the largest number of changes in the post-9/11, post-Resolution-1373 world have
implicated procedures that countries have in place for being able to freeze or seize terrorist assets.
Resolution 1373 requires states be able to “immediately” freeze the assets of those on the UN sanctions
committee list. If there is a lengthy court process that must take place before assets can be frozen, then
such processes cannot operate “immediately.” As a result, there has been a press from the CTC out to the
UN member states to find ways to freeze and even seize assets bypassing domestic judicial intervention.
This pressure implicates two sorts of constitutional safeguards – protection for private property and the
33

Mexico, CTC Report, 1 August, 2002, S/2002/877 at 10.

34

Mexico, CTC Report, 10 September 2003, S/2003/869.
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basic principle that no one shall be deprived of their rights without an opportunity to confront the
evidence that is the basis for the deprivation.
How can the CTC demand that states freeze the assets of individuals immediately and without
prior review by a court? The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee (another committee of the UN
Security Council) creates lists of terrorist groups or individuals without disclosing the evidence on which
the listing is based or even the process through which evidence is assessed. The CTC has been asking
states to take these lists and immediately freeze that the assets of all those on the lists anywhere in the
world. The problem, of course, is that neither the Sanctions Committee nor the CTC has anything like a
procedure for individualized hearings to determine that those placed on the UN lists are in fact who the
Sanctions Committee believes them to be or that the assets so frozen would actually have been available
to assist any terrorist plot. There is also no process at all through which an individual or group can
contest this designation and the states asked to freeze assets are not given any evidence to assess whether
the request is justified.35
The demand that states freeze assets immediately has been complied with (at least as noted in the
CTC reports) quite widely. Most states have found a way to freeze assets of individuals while bypassing
their domestic courts. Sometimes, the freezing is done through an executive order (which means that the
executive is able to suspend the right of property without any semblance of judicial process) or pursuant
to a statute that delegates to the executive the power to enforce Security Council resolutions. Often, there
is a standing order in place for banks to “automatically” freeze assets of anyone on the Security Council
lists.
In the United States, the President is generally delegated by Congress the power to act through
executive order to directly enforce UN resolutions. For example, one such delegation reads:

the President may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures [authorized by the United
Nations Security Council under its Chapter VII powers], through any agency which he may
designate, and under such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate,
regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,
radio, and other means of communication between any foreign country or any national thereof or

35

All we know publicly about these procedures is that all members of the Security Council participate in adding
individuals and groups to the list and that this is done by “consensus.” See the Guidelines at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf .
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any person therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.36

Other countries have even more direct lines of enforcement for UN Security Council resolutions.
For example, France reports that requests to freeze assets of terrorist suspects are handled in an
“automatic” fashion.37 Names pass directly from the Security Council Sanctions Committee to French
banks which have a standing order without intervening command of the French government to freeze all
assets of those on the UN lists.

As Spain noted in its 2003 report to the CTC, a system of “automatic

reception of international treaties” makes it “not necessary . . . to adopt an internal law in order for these
treaties to produce a direct effect in our system.”38 And once Spain signed the convention on terrorism
finance, which overlapped the requirements of Resolution 1373 exactly in this area, no further action of a
domestic court was necessary to freeze assets of specific individuals. In Bulgaria, the list of those against
whom freeze orders could be issued was passed from the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee to the
Bulgarian Council of Ministers which ordered the specific freezes on the proposal of the Minister of the
Interior, bypassing both courts and parliament.39
Some countries give those whose assets are frozen a right to judicial review after the fact. For
example, Belize passed a statute in fall 2001 delegating to the foreign minister the power to freeze assets
at the request of the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee, but allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court
to have these freeze orders set aside.40 Brazil adopted a law that made publication of Security Council
resolutions in the country’s Official Gazette automatic, thereby making them domestic law.41 But all
individual freeze orders are still “subject to due process” after the fact.42 However, by the time of Brazil’s
2003 report, it noted it was working on a process to make freeze orders from the Security Council even
more “automatic.”43
36

Economic and Communication Sanctions Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution, 22 USCS §
287c (2005).
37

France, CTC Report, 10 July 2003, S/2003/270 at 8.

38

Spain, CTC Report, 9 June 2003, S/2003/628.

39

Bulgaria, CTC Report, 9 June 2003, S/2003/692 at 3.

40

Belize, CTC Report, 27 December 2001, S/2001/1265 at 3-4.

41

Brazil, CTC Report, 19 July 2002, S/2002/796 at 6.

42

Id. at 7.

43

Brazil, CTC Report, 21 March 2003, S/2003/356 at 17.
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The demand for immediate freezes of assets of individuals and groups has produced some pushback from states like Venezuela and Mexico which claimed at first that they could not freeze assets
without a judicial order and that they could not get a judicial order without evidence that could be
presented to a domestic judge that the person or group whose assets are frozen had violated a law. 44
Mexico, in particular, was pressed though direct questions from the CTC on their policy of not allowing
assets of suspected terrorists to be frozen if the suspected terrorist could prove the assets were legally
acquired.45

But, after several reports attempting resistance to the CTC, both Venezuela and Mexico

found a way to freeze assets without having to show any individualized proof to a domestic judge.46
As we can see through these examples, many countries have been moving – largely because they
been pushed – toward freezing assets of suspected terrorists under pressure from the UN Security
Council’s Sanctions Committee, without any intervening domestic judicial process that could check either
whether a suspected terrorist really is the person the Sanctions Committee believes him to be or whether
the assets really belong to him.

This is clearly a retreat from constitutionalist principles and from

procedural guarantees that ensure constitutionalist norms apply to the limitation of rights.

Not

surprisingly, in light of what we saw in the earlier section on definitions of terrorism, it happens that
restrictions on rights are directly associated with new powers wielded by domestic executives.

And this

is the hallmark of emergency government – where reasons of state (now internationalized) are given for
concentrating power in the executive and limiting the rights of individuals.

c) Tracking Terrorists through Increased Surveillance

Security Council Resolution 1373 required states to increase their abilities to track and apprehend
terrorists within their borders, and to share information across national borders relevant to this goal. This
has given new license to states to loosen the legal requirements that have to be met before surveillance
can be begun and to increase the length of time that surveillance of individuals and groups can be
maintained. In addition, states have used this opportunity to rearrange their internal and external security
agencies, often merging the institutions of the ordinary police with intelligence agencies that once
reported only through the military.

44

Mexico, CTC Report, 27 December 2001, S/2001/1254 at 5-6.

45

Mexico, CTC Report, 1 August 2002, S/2002/877 at 9 where the CTC is quoted as asking Mexico, “Does article
29 [of the Federal Organized Crime Act] mean that lawfully acquired assets belonging to terrorists cannot be
frozen?” with the clear implication being that this was not good enough.

46

Mexico, CTC Report, 10 September 2003, W/2003/869; Venezuela, CTC Report, 30 July 2003, S/2003/774.
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For example, Argentina revised its intelligence services to remove barriers between national and
provincial intelligence services in January 2002, and reported that it was doing so in compliance with
Resolution 1373.47 Yemen established a special police force for the purposes of fighting terrorism48 and
later reported that it was establishing a special National Security Agency for controlling terrorism
investigations as well.49

Spain has created a National Counter-Terrorism Coordinating Center for

terrorism investigations, which brings together the national police with the Civil Guard (Spain’s
equivalent of the National Guard) and with the military intelligence agency, all with the purpose of
sharing information across their databases.50
Some states have openly changed their laws permitting increased surveillance and allowing new
methods of terrorism detection in their domestic populations. New Zealand, for example, passed the
Interception Capability Act in 2004, which requires the switching points of telecommunications hubs for
phone and internet systems both to maintain a capacity to intercept communications and to comply with
warrants for surveillance at these hubs.51 Canada passed a new anti-terrorism bill in fall 2001, creating
the institution of the investigative hearing. In an investigative hearing, a police officer (upon approval of
the Attorney General) may ask a judge to call a person in for questioning and the person so called may not
refuse to answer questions or refuse to produce “any thing in their possession or control” on grounds of
self-incrimination. The information obtained through investigative hearings may not be used against the
person in a criminal proceeding, but may be used for national security investigations.52

Kyrgyzstan

assured the CTC that its general prosecutor was looking into matters of religious extremism and
developing measures to “prevent the politicization of Islam” in the country and that the Kyrgyz security
services had established a new database in which to store information related to suspected terrorists to
assist in this matter.53
Information gathered by the security services about potential terrorists is now generally shared,
both within and between governments, But what is not shared along with this information are the
47

Argentina, CTC Report, 13 September 2003, S/2002/1023.

48

Yemen, CTC Report, March 2002.

49

Yemen, CTC Report October 2002.

50

Spain, CTC Report, 29 June 2004, S/2004/523 at 10.

51

New Zealand: Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act, 2004 No 19. Art. 13.

52

For more on the investigative hearing in Canada and its post-9/11 uses, see Kim Lane Scheppele, North American
Emergencies: The Uses of Emergency Powers in the United States and Canada. 4 I-CON (INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW) 213-243 (2006).
53

Kyrgyzstan, CTC Report, 4 March 2002, S/2002/204.
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Governments suspected of using

coercion, torture and other illegal means acquire their tainted information and pass it on to other states, of
course without disclosing that compromised methods have been used to acquire it. For example, as the
United States has pursued a policy of using coercive interrogation to wring information from suspected
terrorists it is detaining in a set of secret detention centers around the world,54 information from these
interrogations is shared with allied national security services, who are not in a position to assess whether
the information was obtained using torture and therefore cannot determine whether it is really reliable or
not.55 The result has been that information probably acquired by torture and other forms of coercion is
not only used as if it were reliable by state officials to detain suspected terrorists,56 but it has also now
been used in criminal cases in ordinary courts.57 Of course, the UN Security Council has not publicly
condoned torture, but the framework of Resolution 1373 encourages information acquired through
whatever methods a state feels entitled to use to be passed on to others and to be used in making
judgments about individuals even within states that foreswear the practice of torture.
States are now encouraged to make use of this transnational blizzard of information obtained
from other states in tracking terrorists even if the methods that were used to acquire such intelligence
might not be acceptable in the receiving state. It is already well-documented that people have been put
into indefinite detection in constitutional democracies without charges or trial, based on information
gained from detainees who have almost surely been tortured, even though these constitutional
democracies’ own security services would not be able to conduct such interrogations (at least not

54

For a compilation of evidence that the US has in fact engaged in torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment of detainees in its custody, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism” 1
JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 285-340 (2005).

55

As I have documented, some of the information obtained through torture of high-level al Qaeda detainees has
been admitted as evidence in ordinary courts in terrorism trials in the US, UK and Germany. Kim Lane Scheppele,
The Metastasis of Torture: Circulating Coerced Information in the Anti-Terror Campaign. Paper presented at the
Law and Society meetings, Baltimore, July 2006 and at the American Sociological Association meetings, Montréal,
August 2006.
56

The Home Secretary in the UK claimed that he was not barred from using information acquired by torture in
determining whether to detain suspected terrorists under his new counter-terrorism powers. Though the Law Lords
eventually said that information acquired by torture could not be used by courts reviewing these detentions in order
to decide whether the Home Secretary had detained these suspected terrorists reasonably (the legal standard), the
very same Law Lords said that they could not prevent the executive branch from using evidence acquired by torture
in its decisions to detain in the first place. For the judgment, see Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in
the Cause, A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 at 68-69,
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand-1.htm For an
analysis, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Metastasis of Torture.

57

See Metastasis of Torture for a detailed analysis of the use of evidence acquired by torture in the Moussaoui case
in the US and the Motassadeq case in Germany.
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For example, the recent arrests of suspected terrorists in Britain who were said to have

plotted to bomb several trans-Atlantic airliners headed to the US are now thought to have been spurred by
an interrogation under torture of one of their number in Pakistan.59 The new forms of information
gathering, surveillance and information sharing since September 11 have created an international soup of
information, the precise reliability of which is very difficult to assess. The fact that countries that feel no
limitations on using torture and other forms of coercion are urged to share information with countries that
would not engage in such practices means that the anti-terrorism campaign is full of such tainted
information.

Moreover, the ability of security services around the world to use this information

encourages a division of labor in which some states torture on behalf of other governments who want to
keep their own hands clean.

d) Disrupting Transnational Flows of People

The refugee and asylum system was singled out for special attention in the UN resolution because
the Security Council seems to have believed that terrorists are abusing this system for their own
advantage. But the result has been a crackdown at the borders of many states, prejudicing the claims of
legitimate refugees and asylum-seekers.
One particularly pernicious device for denying what may be legitimate asylum claims comes as
countries (and the UN Security Council’s Sanctions Committee itself60) add new groups and individuals
to the lists of banned terrorist organizations that most states keep these days. Countries often insist on
having their own domestic oppositional groups listed as international terrorist organizations by other
states as the price they charge for their participation in the anti-terrorism campaign. This is how the
Muslim Uighurs, Chechen nationalists and Palestinian activists (among others) have come to be added to
the lists of many countries that used to think of these groups as freedom fighters. Sometimes a country
58

For details of the cases in Britain, see Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause, A (FC) and
others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 at 68-69, available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand-1.htm.
59

Duncan Campbell and Randeep Ramesh, Pakistan Says 'Ringleader' Admits Link With Al-Qaida: Arrested Briton
Has Given 'Many Clues' But Campaigners Say He Was Tortured, THE GUARDIAN, Aug.14, 2006.

60

The Sanctions Committee under Resolution 1267 (1999) formed a subcommittee to list and delist individuals and
organizations associated with terrorism who were also allied with the Taliban and al Qaeda. That list can be found
at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm . The Sanctions Committee has been asked to
consider expanding the international list of terrorist individuals and organizations beyond those involved in the
Taliban and al Qaeda, but in its most recent committee report, it failed to reach agreement on how that expansion
would proceed. See Report of the Security Council Working Group Established Pursuant to Resolution 1566
(2004),
16
December
2005,
S/2005/789,
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/640/18/PDF/N0564018.pdf?OpenElement.
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will attempt to list its own violent domestic opposition as a terrorist group. Once a group is listed as a
terrorist organization,

then other countries are not supposed to allow in members of that group.

Unfortunately, once a country succeeds in listing its own domestic opposition as international terrorists,
then these “terrorists” cannot escape the country where they are being hunted because the international
community has now been called upon to refuse entry to anyone in these listed categories.
Not only have persecuted groups found that the system of international migration has been
blocked by anti-terrorism filters, but the international migration system is now working in reverse – to
send terrorism suspects from countries where their human rights might be protected to countries where
these rights will be violated.

Since September 11, there has been an increase in the practice of

deportation to torture, extraordinary rendition and other transfers of persons among states using methods
that could not have been so easily or frequently deployed before September 11. Sometimes this is done
unilaterally by the US, whose foreign agents have been accused of grabbing people off the streets of
constitution-respecting democratic countries and disappearing them into the gulag of detention centers.61
But often it is done when states don’t have enough evidence against a suspected terrorist to bring them to
an ordinary court, can’t deport the suspect and does not want to give him his freedom.62 In those cases,
extraordinary rendition back to a country that tortures, imprisons without charges and otherwise violates
international human rights norms has become very popular among countries that want to appear to keep
their own hands clean. Doing it secretly has become the way to prevent public criticism of the practice.
Within many states, there has been a sharper separation of citizens and non-citizens in the legal
protections that they are accorded, with measures now being applied to non-citizens (indefinite detention,
61

62

Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW YORKER, 14 February 2005.

This has been flagged as a particular problem by Britain, which feels uncomfortably bound by the judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, (App. no. 22414/93) (1997) 23 EHRR 413,
[1996] ECHR 22414/93. Britain had been on a collision course with the European Court of Human Rights for some
time over the ECtHR’s judgment in this case. In Chahal, a foreign national detained by the UK on national security
grounds was ordered deported back to his home country where he claimed he faced the treat of torture. The ECtHR
told Britain that the UK could neither deport Chahal (because it would violate Art. 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights to return him to a place where he would be tortured), nor detain him indefinitely without charges
(because the only way to hold him would be to charge and convict him of a crime). For a variety of reasons, after
September 11, Britain wanted to detain people whom they suspected of terrorist aspirations, but against whom
criminal charges could not be brought, primarily (it appears) because the evidence against them could not be
presented to a court. But the Chahal case ruled out either deportation or indefinite detention, and the only other way
out (criminal prosecution) was not feasible. As a result, Britain derogated from Art. 5 of the European Convention
after September 11 with a declaration of emergency and it began a policy of indefinite executive detention of
suspected terrorists. An early version of this policy was struck down in Law Lords in A & Others v. Secretary of
State
for
the
Home
Department
[2004]
UKHL
56,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd041216/a&others.pdf on grounds that the policy
impermissibly discriminated against aliens. Parliament then altered the law to permit both nationals and aliens to be
indefinitely detained, with a higher bar to initial classification and greater possibilities for judicial review.
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050002.htm .
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deportations without hearings or on the basis of secret evidence, loosened methods of surveillance) that
could not be used against citizens.

The anti-terrorism campaign has weakened protections of non-

citizens within states all over the world, made it more perilous for those fleeing abusive states to seek
refuge elsewhere and has even permitted the involuntary transnational relocation of persons who have
been fingered as suspects.

These are the major sorts of measures that have become quite widespread since the September 11
attacks occurred and since the UN Security Council framework for fighting terrorism has gone into place.
The anti-terrorism campaign, conducted by states with their own security interests under the broad rubric
of the Security Council’s anti-terrorism framework, has the potential to undermine constitutional
protections for people and property, gives license to states to suppress dissent, and disrupts the
international system of human rights protection through the movement of persecuted peoples.

These

measures have also shifted the balance of power within states away from judiciaries and legislatures
toward executives, the security services, the police and the military.
Before going further, I should say that I don’t think that most of these horrific consequences have
been the Security Council’s intention. Nonetheless, when the international terrorism fight takes priority
over all other international considerations (like promoting constitutionalism and respecting human rights),
the results are predictable. In many ways, the results are similar to what happened during the Cold War,
when the superpowers supported dodgy regimes who at least had the virtue (in the eyes of the
superpowers) of being predictable allies. It became hard for superpower-dependent states caught in the
Cold War maw to move toward constitutionalism and human-rights protection as long as the superpowers
benefited from these client regimes having compliant dictators, one-party states or rights-suppressing
stability. But now that all of the great powers (or at least the powers with Security Council vetoes) are on
the same side in the anti-terrorism campaign, the Security Council itself can be used as an agent for
enforcement of orthodoxy in fighting terrorism.

As during the Cold War, when constitutionalism and

human rights took a back seat to aligning the world as a stand-off between the US and the Soviet Union,
the anti-terrorism campaign has once again sacrificed the benefits of the rule of law, constitutionalism and
human rights protection for the certainty of buy-in to an international program to maintain a transnational
security framework.
The conclusion? The legal framework for the world anti-terrorism campaign cannot be found
solely within the confines of international law, though international law is crucial in the fight. The global
fight against terrorism is being fought predominantly within the legal systems of many states because
international institutions have given these states marching orders (or license) about how to change their
domestic laws to combat terrorism. But these very same international institutions have disavowed any
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responsibility to ensure that the anti-terrorism campaign is conducted in accord with international human
rights law or international humanitarian law, or even in compliance with countries’ own constitutions. As
international institutions are using their tools of lawmaking to reach into domestic politics to fight
terrorism country by country, they are looking the other way when those countries take advantage of the
opportunity to compromise constitutions and limit rights.

States have complied with these new

international mandates at a quite astonishing rate, but that is at least in part because the domestic
executives who have pushed the changes often themselves have something quite directly to gain in terms
of enhanced power and room to maneuver.
As we will see in Part II of the book, though, there is meaningful variation in how countries have
responded to these anti-terrorism mandates.

As I will show there, countries that were the most

enthusiastic participants in the first wave of public law globalization, which involved tying their
constitutional protections to transnational guarantees of rights, have become the most resistant
participants in the second wave of public law globalization, which has involved sacrificing domestic
constitutional protections to fight terror. In short, countries that used international law to entrench their
constitutions and increase domestic human rights protections before September 11 have been more
resistant to using international law to fight terrorism in human-rights- and constitution- violating ways
after September 11.

As I will argue in Part II, the first wave of public law globalization inoculated

countries against the second wave.
Broadly speaking, however, the results of the international and domestic legal partnership in the
anti-terrorism campaign do not bode well for local constitutional compliance. Many of the elements of
the anti-terrorism campaign require states to reduce or eliminate locally guaranteed constitutional
protections and locally enforceable human rights claims for those who live within their boundaries. And
these legal changes implicate international human rights protection as well. Even those states that have
tried to maintain constitutional fidelity have still taken steps that breach some constitutional principles.
As a result, I argue that the anti-terrorism campaign is being fought as a series of internationally
coordinated domestic states of emergency.
emergency.”

We might consider this situation an “international state of
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Chapter 2: The Anatomy of a State of Emergency

If I am going to claim that there is an international state of emergency after September 11, I need
to specify what makes a particular state of law an “emergency.”

Very few states have publicly declared

formal states of emergency in response to September 11. Even in the United States, the presidential
declaration of a state of emergency on September 14, 200163 was limited to invoking the president’s
power to use war-time rules for the military. The president’s invocation of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) on September 21, 2001 to crack down on terrorism financing focused on
27 specific individuals and groups whose assets were to be frozen,64 and did not even sweep as broadly as
it might have under that law.65

The UK declared a more sweeping and formal state of emergency, one

that is still in force. The British emergency invoked the formal emergency powers provision of the
European Convention on Human Rights and explicitly derogated from Article 5 of the Convention (the
provision guaranteeing the right to liberty).66 The derogation enables the UK to keep suspected terrorists
under indefinite detention without charges or convictions.67 From the moment Iraq has had a functioning
sovereign government after the “regime change,” it has been in a permanent and formally declared state
of emergency.

But, in general, few formal states of emergency were declared around the world as a

response to September 11.

How can I insist that what has followed, then, is an international state of

emergency?

63

Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).

64

See Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001). In the Annex to this executive order, President
Bush designated twenty-seven terrorism-linked individuals and entities whose assets were to be frozen.
65

In Kim Lane Scheppele, Small Emergencies, 40 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW 835-862 (2006). I show how states of
emergency work in US federal law. Declared by the president, emergencies typically allow the president to use
emergency provisions placed by Congress into particular laws to bypass the more stringent protections of the
ordinary law. So, for example, the Stafford Act allows the US president to declare a state of emergency (for
example, for weather-related catastrophes) and to direct funds to individuals and groups in the emergency zone,
bypassing the congressional appropriation process under an authorization from Congress in the Stafford Act itself
that he can do so under conditions he deems an emergency. But by declaring an emergency, the president does not
get all possible emergency powers – only those that the president explicitly invokes from a long list of statutes that
give him Stafford-Act-like powers to temporarily bypass cumbersome procedures.
66

Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/3644 (U.K), available at http://www.uklegislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013644.htm.
67

The highest court in the UK has upheld the emergency declaration and the question is now before the European
Court of Human Rights. A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
(Respondent) X (FC) and another (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) ,
[2004] UKHL 56.
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Not all actual emergencies are declared emergencies. When there are such formal declarations,
they tend also to be accompanied by formal legally specified methods for regulating how long an
emergency can last, what may be done in its name and how multiple political bodies have to act to keep it
in place. Emergencies with a sharp legal structure of this sort I call “hard emergencies.”68 But most
emergencies don’t take this form.

Instead, many states slide into at least some aspects of emergency

governance without making a sharp distinction between what is normal and what is the emergency so that
the two blur together in practice. I call these situations “soft emergencies.”

These are in many ways

more troubling because non-declared emergencies generally have no mechanisms for checking, correcting
or revoking them. If we look only at formally declared “hard” states of emergency, we will miss much of
the dangerous, soft slide into non-normalcy.

As a result, I will argue that “emergencies are as

emergencies do.” Instead of identifying states of emergency only by formal legal status or formal
declaration, I will identify a state of emergency by its symptoms rather than by its label.
What are the general symptoms of states of emergency? In this chapter, I analyze the basic
features of clear, historically documented states of emergency in order to see what their central features
are. As we will see, emergencies are not all-or-nothing states of law. But they tend to share common
characteristics.
The data for this chapter of the book come from a series of case studies prepared by the
International Commission of Jurists on the legal features of actually existing states of emergency.69 Jurist
commissioned these case studies to provide input into an international process, then just beginning in the
1980s, to establish humanitarian standards to be guaranteed even in times of emergency.

The case

studies provide particularly good material to work with because their different authors were obviously
instructed to take note of how various elements of emergency powers were constituted as a legal matter.
Although these case studies were written to assist the effort to establish an internationally cognizable
framework of permissible derogations and non-derogable protections during a time of emergency, this
effort has since stalled at the level of expert recommendation and has not moved into more formal
processes of international lawmaking. The empirical efforts of the case study authors to understand what
68

These are the sorts of emergencies that Bruce Ackerman would like the US to incorporate in its federal law.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK (2006).

69

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY: THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1983).
The countries they report on include Argentina (after the military coup of 1976), Canada (uses of the War Measures
Act in the 20th century), Colombia (long history of coups), “Eastern Europe” (characteristic features of the
communist takeovers in East-Central Europe), Ghana (emergencies after independence), Greece (the coup of the
generals from 1967-1974), India (the first three proclamations of emergency after independence), Malaysia (in the
1960s and 1970s), Northern Ireland (and British emergency rule there), Peru (emergencies since 1932), Syria (the
1962 coup), Thailand (declarations of emergency between 1932-1979), Turkey (states of exception from 19601980), Uruguay (the 14-year state of emergency that started in 1968), and Zaire (1960-1980). The final paper will
have examples from these countries and these case studies throughout the text.
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happens legally during emergencies, however, provide good evidence for seeing how actually existing
emergencies work in practice.

As I show in this chapter, emergencies do not just have a distinctive

political profile, they also have a distinctive and substantive legal profile.
Reviewing these case studies on the legal side of emergencies, I show that emergencies tend to
share certain common features, even when the “provocations” for the emergencies vary widely and even
when legal cultures otherwise share little in common. Of course, virtually all emergencies start with the
a real or imagined threat, widely publicized by the government as such. But after that, the main features
of emergencies are, in what turns out to be roughly chronological order:

1. Sharp centralization of political power

A. Power is centralized through an assault on the separation of powers, so as to favor a strong executive:
i) Legislatures are generally disabled in times of emergency. Specific tactics include formally
dissolving parliaments, making it politically impossible for parliaments to do anything
other than acquiesce in the use of executive power, pushing parliaments to delegate
legislative powers to the executive.

In many cases, legislatures disable themselves –

either through passing vague delegations of power to the executive, or failing to meet or
refusing to take up the issues over which the executive is seizing power.
ii) Courts are generally neutralized in times of emergency. This can occur when the executive
simply closes courts. Alternatively, the executive may use more subtle methods like
removing particular categories of cases from the ordinary courts by setting up emergency
courts, restricting the jurisdiction or bases for review available to ordinary courts so that
they cannot reach emergency provisions, suspending the constitution or certain parts of it
so that these provisions may not be legally used as a basis for adjudication, creating new
oaths of office for judges that require their fidelity to the executive, or refusing to
implement decisions of courts. Of course, the judiciary can always be overtly threatened
with severe consequences if they rule against the executive in moments of crisis, or new
politically compliant judges can be substituted for politically resistant ones.

B. In federal systems, power can be centralized by limiting the autonomy and jurisdiction of the regional
units. Some commonly used tactics include:
i) Preempting through federal law substantive matters that used to be under local control. For
example, one might see the federalization of criminal law and punishment once left to the
regions, the merger of local criminal investigation with investigation by the national
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security services under different rules, the incorporation under federal control of
previously decentralized natural resources and infrastructure – rivers, reservoirs, the
electricity grid, local factories.
ii) Commandeering local militias and state armies into national service.
iii)

Altering methods of local governance by central directive. This can include suspending
local elections, appointing local executives from the center, and refusing jurisdiction of
local courts in the name of emergency.

C. Power can also be centralized by changing methods of lawmaking to allow for fewer checks on
executive power. This allows the executive to create law that does not require parliamentary
approval and that often also evades judicial review. As a result, one often finds the executive:

i) Ruling by decree, executive proclamation or other executive-only lawmaking devices.
ii) Invoking military/commander-in-chief powers given in a constitution or super-statute either to
govern through military orders or to disregard civilian law.
iii) Engaging in secret lawmaking.
iv) Aggressively reinterpreting existing laws to accomplish new purposes so that functionally
new laws come into effect without parliamentary approval. The laws on the books may stay the
same but they are used in substantially new ways under the aggressive reinterpretation.

2. Substitution of military methods for ordinary policing

This can occur in the areas of:

A.

Surveillance. In many countries, there is a distinction between methods of military intelligence
gathering and methods of criminal investigation.

The former often evades constitutional

constraint while the latter is generally regulated within constitutional limits. In emergencies, one
often finds state practice moving out of a criminal-justice framework into an intelligencegathering framework. This can involve substituting military intelligence and its associated legal
rules (weaker on individual rights protection) for criminal investigation with its constitutional
constraints.
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B. Personnel. There can be a substitution of military for police in keeping civil order. National guards,
interior ministry police and other militarily trained units are deployed where once civilian police
operated alone.

C. Military tactics. Military rules of engagement often allow more aggressive action than civilian rules
do. These rules of engagement can be used by either ordinary police personnel or by military
personnel.

The military rules of engagement include deploying in military formation (e.g.

deploying police as riot police), using techniques of military occupation (e.g. checkpoints,
curfews), using more powerful weapons than would be used in civilian policing (e.g. mortars,
rocket-launchers, tanks), lowering the bar for first use of force (e.g. instructing police to use
aggressive methods preemptively), permitting killing instead of capture of targets (e.g. shoot to
kill orders), permitting more civilian casualties in order to root out the targets of the action (e.g.
approval of “collateral damage” or collective punishment in police sweeps).

D. Military tribunals and military jurisdiction substitute for civilian courts. Invocation of the system of
courts martial can be used for civilian prosecutions; alternatively, specially constituted tribunals
may be created to try offenders whom the state deems are the targets of the emergency measures.

E.

Martial law. This is usually a specially defined legal state going beyond mere military tribunals to
encompass an alternative model of law. Martial law can be declared in a specific geographical
area (more typical) or pronounced over the whole national territory.

3. The displacement of procedure

The hallmark of a rule-of-law or constitutional state is often its procedural protections, designed to give
power to the individual against the state. In states of emergency, normal procedures are abbreviated or
even abolished through:

A.

Changes in criminal procedure. For example, there may be an increase in preventive detention, a
removal or abbreviation of the right to counsel, the increased use of secret evidence in
adjudication, a loosening of the privilege against self-incrimination, the introduction of
confessions extracted through coercive interrogation, the lowering of evidentiary requirements for
determining guilt, the substitution of summary administrative procedure for more defendant-
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protective criminal procedure, the elimination of forms of evidentiary privilege, the introduction
of coercive methods to compel testimony and necessity-based deviations from the rights of
defendants to confront evidence against them or to have access to evidence in exculpation or
mitigation. In the extreme case, there can be detention or punishment without public presentation
of evidence or, there might be no judicial review of administrative or military decisions made
outside the normal judicial procedures.

B. Changes in expropriation rules. Seizure of private property often accompanies emergencies through
loosening standards through which the state can take possession of private property or asserting
prior claims over certain forms of property (e.g. eminent domain or nationalizations).

Such

seizures are often accompanied by a lack of procedural safeguards. There may be no receipts for
seized property, no records kept of what has been seized, no compensation, and no opportunity to
challenge the seizure. The state may even deny that it is the agent of the seizure.

C. Increased use of collective methods of detection and punishment instead of individualized methods.
Liberal constitutional procedure typically requires individuated proof that a particular person did
something before sanctions can be applied. In emergencies, one often finds collective measures
used instead. For example, there may be police sweeps that detain everyone in the vicinity rather
than requiring individualized evidence for such detention, an increase in judgments of guilt by
association, the use of collective punishment where the target of the punishment may not have
been shown to have done anything wrong, and the practice of threatening friends and family
members so that they disclose information on targets of interest.

D.

Increased resistance of government to investigating civilian complaints or requests for explanation.
For example, the police may fail to respond to missing persons claims or other politically tinged
criminal complaints. Voting rights may be truncated without explanation or appeal. Institutions
that permit appeal of administrative decisions or review of administrative practices may be
closed. The state fails to respond to requests for information or explanation for its decisions.
Offices that are designated to investigate claimed abuses of state power are closed or intimidated
into failing to perform their duties.

E.

Changes in procedures associated with ordinary governance (overlap with 1-C above – e.g.
government by decree, secret laws or secret reinterpretation of laws).
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4. Changing the legal status of speech

In emergencies, there is often a twin maneuver with respect to rights to speech: 1) what was protected
speech becomes unprotected action and 2) what was protected silence becomes mandatory speech.

A. Speech that would otherwise have been protected comes to be seen as a threat or incitement and can
therefore be criminalized as action.

B.

Speech supportive of the “enemy” comes to be seen as an adjunct to enemy tactics. “Proselytizing”
in favor of a cause comes to be equated with banned actions in support of that cause.

For

example, “material support” laws criminalize providing comfort to the enemy. Bans on political
parties and dissident groups may be based solely or primarily on their stated beliefs. Cracking
down on proxies for speech, like punishing membership in an organization, silences speech.

C. Formerly protected silence becomes mandatory speech. The removal of protections for silence can be
used as an emergency measure. For example, there may be adverse inferences drawn from the
silence of suspects or criminalization of failure to disclose information to the authorities.

D.

Use of harsh interrogation tactics to squeeze information from suspects and their supporters.
Interrogation may substitute for other methods of investigation, combining punishment of
suspected targets with tactics of evidence production. Forcing subjects to speak becomes an end
in itself.

What is particularly interesting about this category is the way that the two separate parts of it
(criminalizing speech in some instances and compelling it in others) tend empirically to be found together
even though they are generally regulated under different legal provisions.

5. The reversal of transparency

Under this rubric, the state closes itself off from outside view while simultaneously claiming greater
power of surveillance over the lives of inhabitants.
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A. In an emergency, the state often becomes more opaque than it was before the emergency. For
example, it fails to publicize what it is doing or gives out misinformation about its actions and
intentions. It closes previously open files, archives and processes. It refuses to respond to
freedom-of-information requests. It punishes leaks. The increase in government secrecy often
comes in the name of state defense or national security – which means assimilating the public to
the enemy and excluding both.

B.

Simultaneously, its inhabitants become more visible to the state.

The permissible means of

surveillance may be increased. Individuals become more visible to the state through the use of
electronic surveillance and other remote-sensing tools (like wiretapping, long-distance
photography, night-vision equipment, heat-sensing monitors). There may be an increase in mail
openings and interception of communication as well as an increase in

the number and

intrusiveness of physical searches. Often these are combined with reduced warrant requirements
and a short-cut of the procedural protections that would normally apply to such surveillance and
searches. There is increase in the use of covert surveillance of individuals, groups, meetings and
public gatherings.

Individuals don’t know whom to trust because the use of informants is

widespread.

C. The reversal of transparency may be associated with increased use of the media for state purposes,
with less individual access to the media for other purposes.

The media broadcast state

announcements and the state perspective on the crisis without allowing in other voices.

There

may be a permanent or temporary nationalization of the media. Dissenting publications may be
banned or restricted and their writers and editors subject to harassment or worse.

D. There is often an increased sharing of information on individuals and groups within and among
government agencies while simultaneously making the information on individuals and groups
less visible to each other. For example, the state security services may know more about who is
sympathetic to a particular cause than other sympathizers do because means of communication
among private parties are disrupted while means of surveillance by the state are increased.
Government databases, and the increased use of data matching techniques, often give the
government superior access to information about inhabitants within the state than they can have
about each other.
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Here, too, what is interesting about this category is the way that these two elements – increased
transparency of the individual to the state and decreased accountability of the state to the individual – tend
to move together as an empirical matter, even though there is no necessary link between the two as a
formal legal matter.

6. The use of anticipatory violence

Given that the state has identified what is sees as an urgent threat in order to justify the use of emergency
powers in the first place, it may attempt to respond to that threat before the actual threat can materialize.
As a result, one finds an increase in the justification and use of anticipatory violence – where coercive
measures are used in anticipation of (rather than after the fact of or concurrently with) a threatening action
directed at the state.

This obviously results in an increase of violence overall since not all potential

threats would have materialized even if left alone. But if anticipated threats are acted upon with certainty
before they evolve, then the states ups the ante on violence and often becomes the first aggressor, though
the state justifies its actions by claiming that they are responses to prior provocations.

The state can

predictably use the power of anticipatory violence in particular key settings:

A. Identifying precriminals. If the state expects threats to come from among particular groups and social
locations, then one may expect an increase in anticipatory arrests and detentions. Sometimes
there are no reasons given; other times pretextual reasons are offered for the detentions. Alleged
plots are interrupted before they even form as plots. Criminal charges sometimes do not reflect
what the state actually suspects someone of having done. (So, for example, failure to pay taxes is
charged when conspiracy to commit a subversive act is suspected.)

But the state may take

someone into custody in an emergency on the basis of less evidence and earlier in the trajectory
of the event than would otherwise be the case in a non-emergency.

Prevention becomes more

important than apprehension after the fact. As a result, criminal investigation is directed at
stopping suspicious activity with extraordinary means like detention and disruption rather than
waiting for an imminent threat to emerge to the point where ordinary criminal procedure would
be triggered.

B. Reframing ordinary deviance as an extraordinary threat and acting in the latter frame. Any political
community contains some ordinary deviance. But if this ordinary deviance is reframed as an
extraordinary threat, then extreme measures of detection and prevention may be authorized. So, a
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garden-variety serial killer becomes a terrorist, a typical drug dealer becomes part of an organized
crime conspiracy, a person who contributes to a political cause is laying the groundwork for
revolution.
it.

In emergencies, this reframing is often done in public with little evidence to sustain

For example, nonviolent people with leftist views become plotting communists who have

revolution in their hearts.

If ordinary deviance is reframed as an extraordinary threat, this

justified more extreme measures on the part of the state to intercept it.

C. Changing rules of engagement. Considering itself under imminent threat, the state may act more
aggressively than it would under non-emergency circumstances. This results in changing the
ground rules for when suspects may be killed instead of captured, when premises may be raided
without getting a warrant, when civilians may be treated as if they were military targets.

It may

also affect when a state launches a counter-insurgency operation (in the absence of evidence of
insurgency) or a counter-terrorism operation (without much evidence of imminent terrorism).

This analysis of emergency powers is designed to highlight the key features one finds in actually
existing emergencies. Not all states of emergency feature all of these elements, but most emergencies
have some combination of these elements. To identify “soft emergencies” that have not been publicly
declared as such, I offer the idea of the “family resemblance” method for defining terms (Wittgenstein) in
which the possession of enough features to enable one to look like a member of the family is sufficient for
being classified in the family.

Emergencies, then, can be identified by the degree to which they possess

“enough” of the relevant features, and not in an all-or-nothing fashion.

Using this method, we can spot

creeping or partial emergencies without relying only on the formal declaration or full-blown exercises of
emergency powers.
Looking over the typical features of states of emergency, it should be obvious that many of these
features require substantial adjustment of any constitutional order. Altering either separation of powers
or federalism (item #1) changes the basic constitutional framework in fundamental ways.

Substituting

military methods for ordinary policing (item #2) also affects the constitutional balance of powers and the
ability of individuals to defend themselves against state action.

Procedure is often at the heart of

constitutionalism (item #3) and its truncation has serious consequences for the rule of law. Protection of
speech and the right to remain silent are crucial aspects of a liberal constitutional order (item #4) and their
alteration will have constitutional consequences.

Accountability of the state to its publics as well as the

privacy of publics with regard to state intrusion (item #5) are crucial constitutional features of a
democratic and limited state; the reversal of this balance threatens the possibility of authoritarian
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governance. Finally, the widespread use of anticipatory violence (item #6) signals the breakdown of civil
order and often the very end of the constitutional regime. Each of these six features will typically have
consequences of constitutional magnitude within any state that uses emergency powers.

As I will show

in my later chapters, states vary widely in how extensively they use emergency powers after September
11, but a great many states have moved at least some measure in this direction.
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Chapter 3:
Law is the Way the State Talks to Itself:
A New Theory of Emergency Powers70

How can my “emergencies are as emergencies do” focus be squared with other available theories
of emergency powers? In many ways, focusing on how actually existing states of emergency work can
provide a useful corrective to the existing theories of emergency powers because actually existing
emergencies behave very differently in practice than they are predicted to do by theory. Most emergency
theorists have been interested in the normative side of theory-building – what justifies an emergency?
how should an emergency proceed? – rather than the empirical side, which would focus on what tends to
happen once countries go down the road into emergency powers. Theories of emergencies are, therefore,
predominantly theories about when emergencies can be legitimately declared and what would make their
invocation legally or ethically acceptable, not theories about when they are in fact declared and how they
function.

In this chapter, I want to move from the normative theories to create an empirically based

theory that helps us to understand and explain when emergencies occur and what trajectories they actually
take. This gap between existing normative theories and actually existing practices of emergencies has
two main dimensions that make it hard to see the dynamics of real emergencies:
1. Some emergency theorists have imagined emergencies as spaces outside law, situations in
which normal law is suspended or where normal law is silent (Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen,
Giorgio Agamben). Others have imagined emergencies as a toggle-switch in law, where
normal law is disabled and emergency law kicks in, but only until such time as the situation
enables normal law to be restored (Joan Fitzpatrick, Subrata Chowdhury, Bruce Ackerman).
As I will show, emergencies in practice tend to look like neither of these two models.
Instead, they are enormously “jurisgenerative” periods in which a great deal of new law is
created, law that was not anticipated in advance of the emergency.

Much of this new law

has aspirations to permanence or makes changes in the baseline against which the previous
state of “normal law” was measured. Periods of emergency, then, look like other periods of
rapid legal change, which often makes it difficult to correctly diagnose them as emergencies.
The only thing that distinguishes emergencies from non-emergency periods of rapid change
is the content of these changes and not their form.

We therefore need the exercise I

conducted in the last chapter to distinguish emergency regimes from non-emergency regimes.
70

The section on Schmitt and emergency powers first appeared in Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of
Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11. 6(5) UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1001-1083 (2004).
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2. Theories of emergency have been, until now, relentlessly national in their focus.

All

theorists of emergency have assumed that the timing and functioning of emergency
governments are matters for domestic law alone. Threats that justify emergencies are threats
to national sovereignty; we know where sovereignty is located by seeing who is authorized to
react to existential threats (Schmitt, Agamben). The changes emergencies make are changes
to domestic law and only domestic law can specify when emergencies end (Kelsen;
Ackerman).

While international norms play a role in these processes, specifying when

domestic rights violations have exceeded international standards or laying out potential
models to follow (Fitzpatrick, Chowdhury, Meron, sometimes Ackerman), the usual
dynamics of emergencies have been diagnosed as purely domestic. With the development of
post-September-11 international security law, however, this national focus is no longer
adequate to account for the uses of emergency powers. Instead, as I will argue, we need to
take on board the lessons of globalization gathered from the transnational spread of economic
processes and regulation in order to understand in a robust empirical way how emergencies
have become transnational.

This chapter develops a way of thinking about emergency powers that attempts to account for the
actually existing emergencies we find, the constraints that states feel on their uses of emergency powers,
and the situations that bring emergencies to an end.

a. Normative Theories of Emergencies and an Empirical Criticism

Perhaps the best known of modern theories of emergency powers is that forwarded by Carl
Schmitt, centrally in his Political Theology (1922; 2d ed. 1934; translation 2005). For Schmitt, the ability
to declare a “state of exception” marks the person with the power to do so as the sovereign.

From

Schmitt’s famous opening line, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” it is clear that Schmitt
imagines the sovereign stepping outside the constraints of normal law to enter a space in which there no
rules, but only decisions. In this space of “no rules,” the decisions of the sovereign are the only source of
legality. Why can there be no rules? Because, according to Schmitt,

The precise details of an emergency cannot be anticipated, nor can one spell out what may take
place in such a case, especially when it is truly a matter of an extreme emergency and of how it
is to be eliminated. The precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional competence in
such a case must necessarily be unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point of view, there

Scheppele – draft September 2006

44

International State of Emergency

would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitution can provide
is to indicate who can act in such a case.71

Schmitt’s state of exception is a condition in which anything can happen. The very unpredictability of the
situation means that no rules can anticipate what might be necessary. The constitutional framework can
only give the power to do whatever the situation requires to someone, in Schmitt’s formulation. And that
someone, in Schmitt’s view, is the sovereign. And what makes the sovereign sovereign is precisely that
he has this power.
For Schmitt, liberal constitutions fool their citizens if it appears that these constitutions could have
accounted for everything. There will always be moments outside the range of legitimate constitutional
expectation, and legitimate constitutional action under unanticipated and extreme threats can never be
fully elucidated within a constitution’s terms. This is a clear challenge to the idea that the rule of law
must constrain rulers and ruled alike, for if the rule of law constrains the sovereign entirely, then the
sovereign should not be able to claim exception to the rules. But an emergency makes visible the
incompleteness of the constitutional design because, by its very nature (in Schmitt’s view), the particulars
of an emergency cannot be predicted in advance. In practice, Schmitt seems to say, a liberal constitution
can therefore never be complete. The ability of the sovereign to act outside the rules in the case of
emergency, however, is precisely the signature element that constitutes sovereignty for Schmitt and it is
something with which liberal constitutions cannot dispense unless they are to be destroyed by the
exceptional challenge.
If the sovereign can claim exception, then the sovereign must have all of the lesser-included
powers—for example, the power to decide when the situation has ceased to be “normal,” thereby
justifying the declaration of emergency in the first place; the power to determine when the emergency is
over so that the rule of law may be safely restored; and the power to specify which political actors
normally protected by the rule of law in the non-emergency state lose their protection in the interim.
Rather than seeing the rule of law as something that must be followed for its own sake as a way of
ensuring the integrity of the state, Schmitt argues that the rule of law may prevent a polity from defending
itself in the event of a serious political crisis. As a result, for Schmitt, the capacity of a ruler to maintain
the very existence of the state may depend on that ruler not being bound by the rules.72 In fact, it is the
most distinctive power of a sovereign—not simply an incidental and unusual capacity—that he has the
power to suspend the law in order to save the state.
71
72

Carl Schmitt, POLITICAL THEOLOGY (trans. 1985) at 6–7.

Id. at 12 (“The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation, as one
would say.”).
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Schmitt justified his view that a sovereign must possess the ability to determine the state of
exception in a sociological73 manner:

Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually
applied and which is subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium.
This effective normal situation is not a mere “superficial presupposition” that a jurist can
ignore; that situation belongs precisely to [the norm’s] immanent validity. There exists no
norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist,
and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.
All law is “situational law.”74

According to this analysis, the juridical order itself requires for its maintenance a regular field of
life, a habitus or a certain taken-for-granted predictability, in order for the small deviations that the
juridical order controls to be noticeable. If half the population become murderers, then the law against
murder is no longer a purely juridical matter. Instead, when the field of life becomes so disordered that
the jurist can no longer distinguish between the normal and the abnormal, then the sovereign must act—in
Schmitt’s view—to restore the condition of normality necessary for any rule-of-law system to make
sense. The state of exception is, as a result, the means for restoring the order necessary for legality to
exist. The political moment that justifies invoking the state of exception is the moment when the
possibility of restoring a field of order requires that the rules themselves do not apply to the means of
restoration.
Moreover, according to Schmitt, it is the exception that gives meaning to the rule in the first place,
since one cannot understand a rule except by noting the edges of its applicability. The rule gains meaning
from publicizing what is not covered in its ambit.75 It is therefore the exception that defines the extent
and core meaning of the rule. Through exceptions—and non-exceptions—the juridical order comes to
have its distinctive shape and character.
A more comprehensive “state of exception” of the sort that arises in political crises implicates not
just an individual rule, but the limits of the juridical field itself. Invoking a state of exception to the
73
Schmitt, however, said explicitly that the exception is a juristic and not a sociological category: “It would be a
distortion of the schematic disjunction between sociology and jurisprudence if one were to say that the exception has
no juristic significance and is therefore ‘sociology.’” Id. at 13. By this, he seems to mean that the exception is a
category within jurisprudence even if recognition of its distinctive markers requires sociological judgment.
74
75

Id.

This point is particularly well-elaborated in the analysis of Schmitt in GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER:
SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 15–29 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998).
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juridical field as a whole indicates, as in the case of the individual exception, the defining limits of the
taken-for-granted condition. The possibility of a state of exception existing outside the juridical field but
still within the political field creates the condition for the separation of law and politics. It opens up the
practical reality that the rule of law may cover only part of what politics may do. Consequently, some of
what counts as politics must exist outside the field of law. If, in Schmitt’s formulation, the distinctive
capacity of the sovereign is to define the exception, then the sovereign can never be fully bound by law.
The broader significance of the state of exception, then, is to define the basic qualities of the sovereign’s
responsibility, only some of which are legally defined.
Schmitt’s analysis explores some of the same logical puzzles as does nineteenth and twentieth
century legal positivism—which is not surprising since legal positivists were among his main
interlocutors in the theoretical debates he entered in the 1920s and 1930s in his native Germany.76 For
legal positivists, all law is the command of the sovereign; it exists as a factual matter distinguishable from
any normative argument that might be made in its favor. One of Schmitt’s key interlocutors was Hans
Kelsen, a legal positivist who had his own theory of emergency powers, based more on the sociological
reality of the acceptance of a potential sovereign’s decision to step outside the constitutional order than on
the normative warrant for this action in the first place.

According to Kelsen’s general theory of law,

legal orders are systems of rules related to each other in a hierarchical way, through a “chain of
creation.”77 The basic norm of the system, the Grundnorm, specifies how other legal norms are created.
All other legal norms must get their warrant as legal rules from their pedigree in procedures outlined by
the Grundnorm.

And what holds up the Grundnorm?

According to Kelsen, the Grundnorm is itself

based in a sociological fact: “actual behavior corresponds to the system to a certain degree.”78
Given this view, one can see how Kelsen might begin to think about emergency powers. His
“theory of revolutionary legality” in fact provides a recipe for the successful overthrow of an existing
system of law. All the revolutionary – or the usurper, or the current chief executive – has to do is to
replace the existing Grundnorm with another one, and wait for the people to salute.

If in fact, there is

popular acquiescence in the new Grundnorm and the legal norms founded on it, then the new system is
just as legitimate as the old one. In fact, according to Kelsen, “a national legal order begins to be valid as

76

For more on these debates, see ELLEN KENNEDY, CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE: SCHMITT IN WEIMAR (2005) and
PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY &
PRACTICE OF WEIMAR CONSTITUTIONALISM (1997).
77

HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (trans. Ronnie Litschewski Paulson and
Stanley L. Paulsen) (2002 [1934]) at 56.
78

Id. at 59.

Scheppele – draft September 2006

International State of Emergency

47

soon as it has become -- on the whole -- efficacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this
efficacy.”79
Both Schmitt and Kelsen, then, believed that sovereigns (or those who wanted to be sovereign)
could set aside existing law and substitute something else in its place, something that could be legitimate
if it were indeed accepted by those subject to its command. Schmitt’s sovereign temporarily moves
outside of the previous law, but his actions do not make new law because new law would be rule-bound
and therefore unable to cope with emergencies.

Kelsen’s sovereign, on the other hand, sets aside one

legal system in order to create another; there is no legal government outside of rules.

But while

Schmitt’s sovereign is guided by only his own lights in declaring the exception (and it is his judgment
about what would save the state that ties his anti-legal act to the legal system in the end), Kelsen’s
sovereign is bound to public opinion, or at least public acquiescence, if he wants to make his
revolutionary government “stick” as law.
Contemporary human-rights lawyers have been for years urging a normative conception of states
of emergency different from either Kelsen’s or Schmitt’s.80

They urge states to develop emergency

powers as a form of governance fully within the constitutional-legal framework of ordinary governance.
A state of emergency should be publicly declared, formally limited and exist only when there is a cause
that “threatens the life of the nation.”81 When an actual emergency looms, human rights lawyers say,
states should explicitly use the rules of emergency governance pre-placed within their domestic
constitutional orders – generally requiring explicit starting points, hard sunset provisions, overt
derogations from some rights protections whose permissibility is indicated in advance, strict rules of nonderogation from fundamental rights, and maintenance of procedures of governance that are as true to the
spirit of the original structure of governance as possible (e.g. requiring parliamentary approval of
executive action, if not before the fact, then at least soon afterwards).

Their view is that explicitly

defined emergency powers provide more constraints on the arbitrary use of such power, greater protection
for human rights and a clearer path back to normal governance.
The International Law Association in fact adopted the Paris Minimum Standards of Human
Rights Norms in a State of Emergency in 1984.82 Additional proposals appear as the Queensland
79

HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945) at 220.

80

JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS (U of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY,
RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY (Pinter, 1989); THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE:
THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Cambridge, 1987).
81

82

Paris Minimum Standards, quoted in Chowdhury at 11.

For an explanation of the Paris Minimum Standards by the human rights lawyer who chaired the subcommittee of
the International Law Association that drafted them, see SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF
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Guidelines for Bodies Monitoring Respect for Human Rights During States of Emergency83 and the
Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.84 Many states have also adopted this strategy of bringing emergencies under
constraint of law by outlining the permissible shape of emergency powers within their constitutions (e.g.
South Africa, Germany, Russia). Other states have adopted super-statutes to regulate emergencies within
the framework of law (e.g. Canada, Spain). Bruce Ackerman’s recent contribution to this debate, Before
the Next Attack, similarly proposes a way to bring emergencies into ordinary American public law by
regulating their scope and extent in advance.85
As a theory of emergency powers, and not just a set of rules to that prevents states from
destroying their own democratic and constitutional basis, the formal theory of explicit derogation and
regulation imagines that states of emergency can be contained within normal law, as an alternative mode
of legality within a complex legal structure. In this view, the rules that will go into effect when the life of
the nation is threatened are laid out in advance, based on legislation (or constitutional provision) enacted
after full public debate and possessed of clear limits for when emergencies must end.

Unlike Schmitt,

who believed emergencies existed outside any possible rule-based order, or Kelsen, who believed that
emergencies created a wholly new legal order, the human-rights lawyers build emergencies into existing
legal systems as a sort of trap door for dire circumstances. But, to the human rights lawyers, invoking the
rules of emergency does not set aside the ordinary legal order or create a new one. To them, emergencies
are best conceived as extreme options governed within ordinary legal structures.
Writing after September 11, Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception riffs off Schmitt’s work,
engages international human rights lawyers a bit, but ignores Kelsen.86 This is not surprising, for
Agamben is chiefly interested in dividing emergency theorists into two camps:

1) those who, like

Schmitt, think that one must set aside law to deal with the exceptional circumstances and 2) those who,
like international human rights lawyers, think that the exception should be brought in from the cold and
made subject to legal regulation within an existing constitutional structure.

Because Kelsen believes that
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a revolutionary who casts aside law as inadequate to the situation is moving toward a new and different
legal system more adequate to the situation, this doesn’t quite fit Agamben’s typology of theories.
Agamben sets up this opposition between the state of exception as existing outside law (Schmitt)
and inside law (modern international human rights lawyers) in order to use his own conceptualization to
fill the space in the middle. For Agamben, the exception is neither inside nor outside law. It has “the
force of law without law;”87 it merely suspends the law without canceling it, and therefore the exception
owes its existence to the ongoing possibility that law suspended during an emergency will be unsuspended and therefore resume normal force.

The exception is, as Agamben says, “not a ‘state of law,’

but a space without law” or a “juridical void.”88 It is, as it were, a “time out” from law. The exception
provides a link between two attributes of governance – auctoritas (roughly, the authority that has its
source in expertise, interpretation of texts or charisma) and potestas (roughly, the power to get things
done) – without collapsing completely into either.

When law fails, the sovereign can nonetheless be

effective by suspending the law in order to accomplish goals that enable the law to be restored.

The

space between the suspended operation of law and the accomplishment of political goals necessary for the
endurance of the state, says Agamben (like Schmitt), is the space of politics.
But all four views of states of emergency (the Schmittian sense of setting aside the law; the
international human rights lawyers’ sense of the constitutionally regulated space inside the law; the
Kelsenian sense of the newly constituted law; or the Agambenian sense of the exception as the space
between power and authority or the space of no law) seem quite unable to shed light on what happens,
legally speaking, during actually existing emergencies. Why is this? They seem not to have paid careful
attention to the way that actually existing emergencies typically work.
Actually existing emergencies are not in fact periods of legal silence, legal absence or the general
suspension of law as such. They are periods of enormous outbursts of lawmaking. New decrees fly fast
and furious; proclamations, regulations, and new military orders are produced in such a mad rush that new
law seems to occupy all available governmental space. Unlike the jurispathic courts described by Robert
Cover, emergencies are nothing if not “jurisgenerative.”89
Why is this? If we think about law not as a purely legitimating force or as the sincerely believed
normative order of a state, but simply as the way the state talks to itself, it is not surprising that
emergencies are accompanied by a tremendous proliferation of law that pays careful attention to its own
warrant, its own authority, its own pedigrees. After all, if an emergency is to be handled differently from
87

Id. at 39.

88

Id. at 51.
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Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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“normal times,” then the various parts of the state that are going to accomplish the “different handling”
need to be told what to do and they need to be told what to do in an authoritative manner. The military
are given rules of engagement; the police are instructed through new rules of order; the ministries are told
what their new operating rules are. Some of these new orders may well be secret, of course, but they
nonetheless must have the appearance and function of law or the parts of the state to which they are
directed would simply assume they were not being addressed.

Redirecting the state to deal with a

different enemy, a new threat, an imminent crisis requires an immense amount of law production because,
in fact, large parts of the state will be instructed to behave differently in a time of trouble.
Some of this new law that addresses the declared threat will displace the preexisting law, as one
might imagine from Schmitt or Agamben. But then again, outside an emergency context, any law that
amends a prior law does the same. Merely changing the content of law by following the rules of the
system for making new law occurs all the time without threatening the very existence of the legal system.
Most emergency governments will conduct the emergency through the announcement of some new rules
that displace prior rules, some rules that merely reinterpret old rules and some rules that already had in
them toggle switches between emergency and non-emergency operation. 90 But even a powerful dictator
cannot run an emergency through no law or only through pre-existing law. At some level, all of the
theories of emergency powers grasp some element of this comprehensive revitalization of law that occurs
during an emergency. But in actually existing emergencies, no government operates according to any of
the pure theories, taken alone.
The reason why the theories of emergency seems so out of touch with the practice of actually
existing emergencies is that they miss both the daily operating functions of law and also how much of law
is unchanged through an emergency. Law does not just express moral positions, or public values, or the
basic working structures of the state. Public law, in particular, provides direction to state officials, who
need to be told what to do equally in times of normalcy and times of crisis. In fact, public officials may
need more explicit and direct instruction during an emergency, and this is consistent with the hyperproduction of law at such a time. Even with this vast production of new law in an emergency, however,
most of a legal system will remain unchanged. In the paradigmatic cases of permanent emergency, Nazi
Germany or Soviet Russia, much of ordinary private law and even quite a lot of criminal law showed no
signs of political influence.91 Public law changed, of course, but that did not involve remaking the entire
90
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legal order. When colonial governments collapsed and were replaced by independent post-colonial ones,
often the vast iceberg of private law remained unchanged.

Even in the most autocratic state or dire

emergency, also, much of what used to be “normal law” still persists. As a result, all of law will never be
in the sort of crisis that theorists like Schmitt and Agamben suggest. And it will rarely be the case, as
with Kelsen’s theory of revolutionary legality, that the whole legal system is replaced at such at time.
The Pakistani Supreme Court, as we will see later, realized this early on in its rulings about the legality of
emergency powers and has attempted to force a long line of military dictators to specify in advance just
how much of law was being temporarily changed during the emergency. The Court then held the line to
prevent emergency regulation from spilling into the protected areas of law.92
As we saw in Chapter 2, emergencies have a typical structure (first, centralize executive power;
then, consolidate control over the military; then, authorize shortcuts in procedure; then chip away at rights
etc.). Taking this seriously, we can imagine that emergencies should be defined not so much by their
formal properties (e.g. a space with “no law”) but instead by their substantive characteristics – executive
centralization, deployment of the military, cutbacks in all other institutions that can put up resistance to
the executive while curtailing accountability of that executive.

A theory of emergency powers should

therefore be a theory of a specific form of government – one in which separation of powers and individual
rights have been limited, while the executive consolidates control over a monopoly of violence.
Regardless of whether this sort of government calls itself an emergency government, and regardless of
whether this sort of government proceeds by rules specified in the constitution or whether it sets the
constitution aside, this book will proceed to examine states of emergency as substantively distinctive
forms of government.
But reframing states of emergency in this way is not yet enough to comprehend what has
happened after September 11 because there is an international dimension to the emergencies generated
after that date.

b. Internationalizing the State of Emergency

The new international state of emergency after September 11 poses yet another new challenge to
theories of emergency. The available theories of emergency powers (including the one that I just
sketched as my own) either assume that there is no role for international law in these processes or
presume that the pressures to move into emergency governance will come solely from inside a particular
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state. So, for example, in the human rights literature on permissible derogations in a time of emergency,
international law is viewed as providing the uniform standards that, like the North Star, serve as the stable
point of reference that permits navigation through troubled local waters. Human rights lawyers have
attempted to develop an international humanitarian framework to regulate states of emergency the way
that the Geneva Conventions regulate humanitarian issues within states of war. This effort has foundered
at the moment. But it carries an implicit faith in the civilizing powers of international law to counter
emergencies.93

This is because the proponents of the proposed humanitarian conventions for times of

emergency envision emergencies as matters entirely internal to countries, and they contend that
international law can provide the standards for minimizing harm when individual countries hit rocky
patches.

The theories of Schmitt and Agamben do no better at imagining emergency powers as

embedded within a transnational web of influence. For them, the state of exception is precisely what
defines the sovereign’s power; the ability to set aside law (or in Agamben’s view, to stand between law
and politics) is defined only relative to a particular national government.

What happens when

international law is an important source of the destabilization and the pressure to use emergency powers?
The present international state of emergency (the ISOE) envisions a very different relationship
between international and domestic law, and, as such, requires rethinking the available models.

The

ISOE uses the domestic law of multiple countries in parallel to solve an international problem, and it is
tied neither to traditional conceptions of national sovereignty nor to recognition by domestic populations
of legitimate authority. The operation of the new international state of emergency is not based on an
extralegal conception of emergency as one would guess from reading Schmitt and Agamben. For one
thing, while emergency powers in use today may be outside domestic law, they are still within
international security law. This new ISOE also does not take into account empirical evidence of law in
action as one would imagine from reading Kelsen. The operation of international law in this conflict is
often not visible to the domestic populations whose acceptance would be crucial for legitimation of it.
The ISOE also does not imagine that international law works through providing a legal constraint on
purely domestic tendencies, as the international human rights scholars would argue. International human
rights scholars imagine that anti-constitutional problems originate within national spheres and that
international law can work to restore constitutional principle.

But the opposite is true here: the new

international security law is one of the forces pushing countries to deviate from their own constitutional
practices. As a result, we need a new theory of emergency to cope with this internationalization of
emergency powers.
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Many of the pressures to comply with international security law come from outside particular
constitutional systems, and those who are doing the pressuring often do not even know the local
constitutional norms that might constrain states in complying with what international organizations are
asking. So far, for example, I have not seen a single mention in the CTC requests to states of any concern
that the measures states are being urged to adopt to comply with the Security Council resolutions might
conflict with domestic constitutional practices. Instead, CTC requests take limitations of local law that
get in the way of enforcing resolutions as problems that have to be fixed. And in the bilateral relations
that have added additional pressures to states to comply with international law (for example, as US
foreign policy increasingly organizes itself around the “you’re with us or you’re with the terrorists”
formulation) generally do not take local constitutional constraint into account.94
At the transnational level since September 11, human rights enforcement has taken a back seat to
the enforcement of international security law.

For one thing, the resources to ensure compliance with

international security law available to the Security Council are far greater than those available for human
rights monitoring. And for another, the Security Council has shown no interest in evaluating compliance
with their security law resolutions against human rights standards. As a result, international human rights
law remains a vague promise of international institutions.

International security law, which could be

tempered by a pairing of its power with international human rights law, has so far operated alone.
How, then, should we think about states of emergency with this international dimension? I argue
here for a new theory that takes on board the new internationalized context of emergencies.
My theory of the ISOE gets its inspiration from globalization theory. Globalization theory has
focused on the integration of national markets into a transnational economy, with the accompanying and
dizzying sense that the flow of ideas, capital, people, images and goods across national borders has
greatly altered the place of national institutions in these processes. These “flows” have put pressures for
change on specific sites that had configured their priorities only against a national frame. But many sites
that show transnational influences are also the places where cross-pressures coming from either local
history or still other distant locations are present, too. When one looks locally, one sees contradictory and
conflicting tendencies that appear rooted in place. It is only when one sees the international context and
the influences that transcend place that the local conflicts make sense as the product of international
forces. There are in short, disjunctures created by the different speeds, routes, vectors of influence and
94
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networks of influence that move along the objects, ideas and people in a globalized world. Arjun
Appadurai has helpfully provided concrete examples:

Examples of such disjunctures are phenomena such as the following:

Media flows across

national boundaries that produce images of well-being that cannot be satisfied by national
standards of living and consumer capabilities; flows of discourses of human rights that generate
demands from workforces are repressed by state violence which is itself backed up by global
arms flows; ideas about gender and modernity that circulate to create large female workforces at
the same time that cross-national ideologies of “culture,” “authenticity” and national honor put
increasing pressure on various communities to morally discipline just these working women who
are vital to emerging markets and manufacturing sites.

Such examples could be multiplied.

What they have in common is the fact that globalization – in this perspective a cover term for a
world of disjunctive flows – produces problems that manifest themselves in intensely local forms
but have contents that are anything but local.95

Globalization, in Appadurai’s analysis, brings cross-pressures that appear as local problems and local
conflicts, even though they originated elsewhere.
We can see the sorts of things that Appadurai highlights in our examination of the way domestic
public law has worked even before September 11.

The first wave of public law globalization brought

the claims of human rights and the devices for ensuring protection of human rights to countries emerging
from fascism, colonialism, communism, military government and other “regimes of horror.”96
Internationally backed conceptions of human rights were then brought into the constitutional layer of
domestic law by new constitution drafters.97
95

By the time that the second wave of public law

Arjun Appadurai, Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination.
Appadurai Duke University Press, 2001) 1-21at 6
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globalization – international security law -- came along, it confronted a domestic law that had been
shaped by a different set of globalizing forces in an earlier period, but which by the 21st century had
become entrenched as local.

So the tension in domestic law between the new uses of emergency powers

and older constitutional structures can be seen in part as the intersection of two different and contradictory
flows of transnational influence. The conflict appears local, but the sources for both sides of the conflict
are transnational.
Saskia Sasssen sees the way that the mobility of money, goods, people and ideas has the potential
to create a world order, but she also sees that, at the moment, many of the symptoms of conflict in this
new world appear as embedded in local law. As she noted:

Global processes are often strategically located/constituted in national spaces, where they are
implemented usually with the help of legal measures taken by state institutions.

The material

and legal infrastructure that makes possible the global circulation of financial capital, for
example, is often produced as “national” infrastructure—even though increasingly shaped by
global agendas. This insertion into the national of global projects, originating both domestically
and externally, begins a partial unbundling of national space. It is only partial, as the geography
of economic globalization is strategic rather than diffuse, as well as for the reason that national
space was never unitary or fully integrated to begin with, despite its institutional construction as
such.98

Sassen, also, provides a framework within which the idea of the international state of emergency fits as
absolutely normal. The domestic legal infrastructure in any particular place allows a set of globalizing
forces to link global and local agendas, in much the way that local financial markets are legally regulated
by national law to enable the global flows of capital.

Seen in this light, the international state of

emergency is to the public law side of legal practice what transnational economic regulation has been to
the private law side.

It is the legal form through which purely national agendas have been shaped and

regulated in light of transnational interests and also the national way in which transnational purposes are
accomplished.

The ISOE is, then, completely novel in one way, because of its specific content, while

simultaneously comprehensible as a standard form in another way because the linking of national law and
transnational agendas is already a commonplace in other areas of law.

98

Saskia Sassen, Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization. GLOBALIZATION (ed.
Appadurai) 260-278 at 264.

Scheppele – draft September 2006

International State of Emergency

56

The legal side of globalization theory has focused on the roles of transnational lawyers in the
making of transnational deals,99 the legal assistance given to the transnational movement of capital while
legal barriers are erected for the movement of peoples,100 the way that networks of labor have countered
networks of capitalists around the struggle for international law,101 and the way that universal legal forms
have come to dominate national law as a way of making multinational capitalist institutions feel at home
everywhere.102 In each of these strands of work, we can see an interaction between the local and the
global. At any particular point and on any particular topic in the legal regulation of the global economy,
there is a distinctively tailored mix of the global and universal on the one hand and the local and the
culturally specific on the other. Globalization, even in the economic sphere where it has gone the
furthest, doesn’t sweep away local institutions, customs, and norms as it takes hold. It co-opts them into a
larger project.

Similarly the production of local norms and customs didn’t take place at some romantic

point in the past when all influence was local.

International flows of ideas, people, prejudices and

resources shaped local materials and ideas in the first place, and it is these now domestically produced
condensations of previous transnational influence that confront the new transnational influences as local.
In analyzing the international state of emergency, then, I explore the relationship between the
universal aspirations of globalizing law and the local adjustments made on the ground in response.
International organizations have created “universal” frameworks for fighting terrorism; the local
adaptations are different in each place, depending on local needs, prior residues of globalization, the
configurations of local power in place.

The converse process is also interesting to examine:

local

agendas (particularly those of powerful states) attempt to capture the resources of globalized institutions
in order to lauder their home-grown needs as universal. So, for example, the United States was behind
Security Council Resolution 1373, and therefore it is not surprising that Resolution 1373 tracks in its
particulars the main features of the USA PATRIOT Act, which was being put before Congress at the
same time.

After the Beslan school massacre, Russia came to the Security Council to ask for another

resolution, which it got. Resolution 1566 set up a task force to study expanding the list of terrorist groups
and individuals beyond the Taliban, al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and their associates, to which the
Security Council had limited its sanctions up until that point.
99
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expanding the listed terrorist groups beyond those clearly responsible for the attacks of 9/11 to those
responsible for terrorist attacks elsewhere (for example, “terrorists” among the Chechens, Basques,
Uighurs, Palestinians, Tamils or other groups with separatist or nationalist aspirations).

Such an

expansion would, among other things, permit any state whose local conflicts could be made to fly under
the banner of international terrorism to enlist the international community on the state side of that local
conflict. In the Security Council resolutions that have defined the global anti-terrorism campaign, we can
see clear attempts by powerful states to internationalize their own local conflicts.
As I will argue here (and show in the rest of the book), globalization of security law reveals many
of the same patterns that we have seen in globalization in the economic arena, where it has been long
taken for granted and is more deeply entrenched. Local elites – primarily national presidents and prime
ministers who are the main actors who gain from this new security push – use the forces at their disposal
to adapt international law to carry out potentially controversial local projects in the name of international
mandates. Local targets of these projects (particularly those who are deemed enemies in the new security
push) as well as resistant local non-targets (particularly those who object to the spread of emergency
powers) push back locally and join globally with others in the same situation. The international state of
emergency is, at least in some locales, then met with a counter-emergency resistance that itself spans
national borders.

This counter-emergency resistance consists both of networks of “enemies” (since

September 11, the Islamist network itself) and networks of constitutionalists (human rights activists and
trans-nationalist judges).

Though of course the terrorists and the constitutionalists are massively

different in every other way we can imagine, the crucial thing to note is that the security-based
transnational network of executives, militaries and police is being met not just with local resistance but
also with transnationally organized resistance. In short, domestic constitutional struggles may be waged
by local actors each with their own transnational support systems. The domestic and the transnational are
linked together in multiple networks that all engage this problem with different methods and different
ideals.
What happens to law in all of this? Law frames this picture in several ways:
First, much of the dialogue between local and global occurs in legal terms. Security Council
resolutions and their regional equivalents create the legal framework within which states are called upon
to make responses, which are themselves first made by changing local law.

The security dialogue

between global and local elites is, as a result, conducted through the language of law. Reports by states to
the Security Council emphasize the measures each state has taken in its local law to comply with the
Security Council mandates.

And the Security Council clearly wants compliance with its resolutions

entrenched in domestic law to match what it has done through the creation of international law.
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Second, the forms of resistance are often themselves couched in legal terms as well.

In

particular, local activists may deploy domestic constitutions and international human rights claims to
counter the security dialogue. This places the domestic debate in a legal frame as elites engaged in the
security dialogue and elites engaged in the constitutionalist dialogue jointly determine how far emergency
powers are invoked. Local forces of resistance often rely on the tactics made available within domestic
constitutional orders, bolstered by international human rights support and also (typically) by appeals to
the memory of past horrors that have underwritten both the domestic and international human rights
system. That is how the present international state of emergency has been concretely negotiated – and
sometimes blunted – in particular sites.

To show how this works, we now turn to the analysis of some specific cases of states that have
responded to the call of international security law to change their domestic laws after September 11.
Looking at specific cases helps us to trace out the effects of global and local influences, the negotiations
among different local elites, and the resulting mix of laws that reflect participation in the anti-terror
campaign.
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PART II: CASES

Part II of the book develops a series of case studies in which the elements outlined in Chapter 2
that comprise states of emergency are deployed to trace the uses of emergency powers before and after
September 11, using the theoretical frame drawn from globalization theory that was outlined in Chapter 3.
Because I am interested in understanding not only what makes states slide into emergency but also what
prevents them from doing so, I have tried in each chapter to pair two states that are either similar in their
long-term legal profiles or that are subject to the same set of external and internal constraints in the recent
development of their domestic law. The key point of difference between the two countries in each pair,
however, is that one country in each pair was an eager participant in what Lorraine Weinrib has called the
“post-war constitutional model” (that is, the first wave of public law globalization that linked domestic
constitutions to transnational rights regimes)103 and the other country in each pair either sat out that wave
of public law globalization or actively opposed it (having an exceptionalist view of its own law or a
deeply suspicious view of international law). The first wave of public law globalization linked a variety
of countries in a common constitutional project in which the domestic advocates were part of
transnational networks that both spread and validated these constitutional ideas. The post-September-11
security law framework unites a different set of domestic advocates with their transnational counterparts
as well.
In the chapters below, I have identified Canada and Germany as being leading participants in the
first wave of public law globalization; Spain and India as being important contributors to it from a bit of a
remove and in a less thorough-going way.

Among countries that did not actively participate in

institutionalizing in their domestic law the transnational human rights framework of this first wave of
public law globalization, I look only at governments with entrenched constitutional systems, but where
their domestic constitutional courts and governmental institutions did not hook themselves up to the
transnational constitutionalist network.

In the chapters below, I have identified the US and the UK as

having firmly entrenched constitutional systems in which domestic exceptionalism is exalted and Russia
and Pakistan as more recently arrived constitutionalist systems that have made some efforts to join the
transnational constitutionalist movement but whose dominant legal framework shows mostly
exceptionalist tendencies. The contrast I am trying to explore here is between those constitutional
systems that were already deeply engaged in the transnationalist dialogue before September 11, seeing
their constitutional orders as part of a global constitutional movement, and those that remained
exceptionalist, seeing their constitutional histories primarily as purely national accomplishments. In this
103
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way, I hope to see whether adoption of the transnationalist constitutional model before September 11
made any difference in the extent to which states have embraced emergency powers after September 11.
In each of these chapters, I trace the history of emergency powers as well as the connections
between domestic constitutional law and transnational human rights law in each country and then explore
each country’s legal responses since September 11.

Each of the case study chapters compares two

countries facing similar legal histories and/or similar present legal constraints, except that one country in
each pair was an enthusiastic participant in the first wave of public-law globalization and the other stayed
outside this movement. Thus, I compare the US with Canada, the UK with Germany, Russia with Spain,
Pakistan with India.

Choice of Cases for Part II of the Book
Participated in first wave of Did not participate in first wave;
public law globalization; tied exceptionalist views of domestic
domestic law to international law law
North American former British
Canada
US
colonies
Core EU states
Germany
UK
Europe’s edges/
Spain
Russia
post-authoritarian governments
South Asian edges of the former
India
Pakistan
British empire
The conclusion from these case studies overall? The more complete the acceptance of the first
wave of public law globalization was before September 11, the more resistant the country has been to the
counter-constitutional temptation of emergency powers.

Or, put differently, the more a country

participated intensely in the first wave of public law globalization dealing with human rights, the less
thorough-going has been its participation in the second wave of public law globalization dealing with
transnational security law.

It would seem from these case studies that having a strong transnationally

backed constitutionalist culture provides local resources for fighting the slide into emergency powers.
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Chapter 4:
North American Emergencies:
The United States and Canada104
The US and Canada share a legal culture descended from the British constitution and the common
law. The process of the patriation of North American constitutions was obviously more rapid in the US
than in Canada, but in both countries, there is a surprising similarity of methods for dealing with states of
emergency through the 19th century up through the early post-WWII period.

In the 19th century, states of

emergency typically involved local governors declaring local instances of martial law and then calling in
federal troops at the discretion of the federal executive to put down local disturbances. But by WWI, both
countries tended to regulate national emergency powers by statute. In Canada, the statute (the War
Measures Act) tended to be a general all-purpose emergency law (used in WWI, WWII and the October
Crisis of 1970). In the United States, Congress tended to write special emergency powers into individual
pieces of legislation, generally eschewing general emergency laws.

In both the US and Canada,

emergencies were typically easy to get into and hard to get out of.

In many emergency situations,

executives were reluctant to let go of emergency powers when the emergency was over. In neither place,
until recently, was the state of emergency brought fully under the constraint of constitutional law.
The paths of the two countries began to diverge as Canada recoiled from the use of emergency
powers in the October Crisis of 1970, when the War Measures Act was invoked and federal troops
occupied Québec. In recovering from this emergency, Canada moved decisively toward tying its own
constitutional law to the transnational human rights movement through the full patriation of its
constitution. This occurred in 1982 with the adoption of the Constitution Act 1982, centrally featuring
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada’s new emergencies law, passed after the Charter went into
effect, clearly contemplated that all emergencies were to be subject to constitutional constraint. The US,
on the other hand, stayed outside the emerging new transnational constitutional order and reformed its
emergency laws only in cosmetic and piecemeal ways in the 1970s as part of a general movement toward
good governance after the discovery of massive abuses of civil liberties in the name of national security.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the National Emergencies Act, the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and the War Powers Resolution were intended to prevent executive
abuse of emergency authority during times of trouble.

104

A version of this chapter appeared as Kim Lane Scheppele, North American Emergencies. 4 I-CON
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When September 11 occurred, both Canada and the US considered sweeping anti-terrorism laws,
as the UN Security Council required, but the process of civil society mobilization substantially watered
down the emergency legislation being considered in Canada. In addition, constitutional constraints on
government action (announced by courts and monitored by civil society) has prevented the emergency
powers that were enacted from being invoked routinely in Canada.

As a result, the most controversial

features of the law that eventually passed have rarely been used. The investigative hearing, which gets
judges involved in terrorism investigations by using them to interrogate terrorism suspects outside of the
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination, has been used only once. The new system of
preventive detention has never been used. As I write, the most constitutionally controversial element of
Canada’s counterterrorism policy – which consists of issuing security certificates against aliens suspected
of terrorism, certificates that permit indefinite detention without charges or rapid deportation without
procedural safeguards) is now being challenged before the Supreme Court of Canada.
By contrast, the USA PATRIOT Act was just the beginning of a variety of legal measures that
raised constitutional questions. Even more extreme measures include (among those we know about at
this point): the detention of even citizens as enemy combatants by executive decree, aggressive uses of
the material witness statute to create a system of preventive detention, the creation of a far-reaching
program of warrantless wiretapping, the failure to notify Congress (or even the whole of the relevant
committees) about edgy new interpretations of law as well as secret anti-terrorism programs, the use of
the Office of Legal Counsel’s advice to declare laws secretly unconstitutional and therefore to give the
president a reason not to follow them, the use of signing statements to create ambiguity about whether and
how the president intends to enforce (or even to follow) the law, the appeal to courts to dismiss any cases
challenging these policies through a state secrets privilege and of course the decision to go to war in Iraq
itself. As a result, the US fell much farther into a state of emergency than did Canada after September
11.
Of course, one obvious explanation for this is that the US was attacked on September 11, but
Canada wasn’t.

This explanation seems far less obvious when one considers both that Canada had,

throughout its history, considered all threats that targeted primarily the US as its own and that other states,
apart from Canada, reacted in an even more extreme way to September 11.
I argue that Canada’s culture of constitutionalism, developed by hooking Canada’s constitution to
transnational human rights developments in the 1980s, acted as a sort of vaccine against falling too far
into the use of emergency powers after September 11. Even when a conservative government more
openly sympathetic to the US government came into power, there was no general invocation of tough
emergency powers.

By contrast, the US, which has always had an exceptionalist constitutional culture
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and a sense that the government always rights itself after anti-constitutional excesses has used emergency
powers in an extreme way after September 11.

Chapter 5:
Varieties of Europe and the Different Trajectories of Constitutional Constraint:
The United Kingdom and Germany105
While Germany and the UK are quite different in their specific legal histories before the postWWII period, they are both now increasingly integrated into a common European legal framework. Both
are bound to follow the European Convention on Human Rights, along with the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights. Both are core member states of the European Union with its increasingly thick
web of common legal ideas. Both were not specifically and directly attacked in September 11 but both
were used as staging grounds for the attack. Both had had traumatizing episodes of domestic terrorism in
the 1960s and 1970s; both had – in current political judgment – overreacted at that time. Both had
attempted to put their own emergency powers on a more rights-based footing since the last wave of
terrorist attacks.
Throughout the 19th and 20th century, Britain and Germany had quite different constitutional
histories. Britain’s constitutional trajectory was, during this period, unbroken, and it portrays itself as
increasingly rights-protective and increasingly democratic over this period. Germany’s constitutional
trajectory was, at the same time, full of stops and starts (the constitution of 1848 never went into effect;
Bismarck’s unification constitution did not include rights; the model Weimar constitution fell for lack of
liberal defenders).

Germany’s constitutional self-conception after WWII emerged from shame, remorse,

anger at the division of the country and convinced that the fall from constitutionalism would never happen
again. By contrast, Britain was left with its constitutional framework intact at the end of the war. One
might guess from these histories that, if there were some current difference between the two countries in
their tendencies to protect constitutional frameworks after September 11, Britain would have a more
robust constitution in the face of international pressures than would Germany.
But Germany has been the model of building transnational human rights into its own
constitutional structures, using its own history as the leading negative example to show why strong
adherence to transnational human rights norms had to stand at the core of a constitutional order. Britain,
105

Parts of this chapter appeared in Kim Lane Scheppele, Other People’s PATRIOT Acts: Europe’s Response to
September 11. 50 LOYOLA LAW REVIEW 89-148 (2004).
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like the US believing itself to have a historic self-correcting constitutional culture that needed no
modification, stayed outside these developments and has generally developed in an exceptionalist way.
As a result, it was Britain rather than Germany that fell into extraordinary uses of emergency
powers after September 11. Britain’s response was, if anything, more extreme than that of the United
States on the domestic front106 and certainly far more extreme than that of Germany. The UK declared a
formal state of emergency and derogated from the European Convention on Human Rights with respect to
powers of indefinite detention. The government also seized new powers to bypass normal warrants, limit
the right to counsel, and engage in unlimited detention of both aliens and nationals without charge.

A

sweeping new terrorism law was passed in the UK in fall 2001, with the explicit justification that the UK
was following Resolution 1373. This 2001 anti-terrorism law added to the rather draconian anti-terrorism
law that had gone into effect shortly before September 11. Since that time, the government has pushed
through radical new civil emergencies bill that lowers the bar for declaring emergencies and allows
ministers to make binding law without parliamentary participation.

Police aggressively used their new

military-like powers to harass political dissenters through the creation of the newly authorized “cordon
zones”; the Blair government went to war in Iraq against massive popular opposition. The government
claimed the right to use evidence acquired by torture in locking up suspected terrorists, and the Law Lords
told the government that the courts could not consider this evidence in determining whether the detentions
had been properly authorized.

But, the Law Lords said in smaller print, it was ok for the executive

branch to use evidence acquired by torture in its initial judgment to detain potential terrorists.107
Germany, by contrast, passed the laws that the Security Council required of it, but civil society
mobilization trimmed the harsher edges from the law, as had occurred in Canada as well. The role of the
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (the domestic intelligence service) has been expanded and
this office is now permitted to coordinate its activities in unprecedented ways with the federal police.
New identity cards with biometric data were authorized; Germany’s famously strict protection of personal
data was loosened.

But civil liberties complaints have been few in Germany, despite the fact that

Germany has caught more people directly involved in the planning of the September 11 attacks than any
other country.

Germany has insisted on using public evidence in regular courts to convict al Qaeda

members and has shown substantial success in fighting terrorism while not derogating from its
106

As we add up all of the programs that the US engaged in secretly after September 11, this may not continue to be
true. But in the public programs that the governments rolled out after September 11, those in Britain were more
extreme in their compromises of civil liberties and (such as it were) separation of powers than were those of the US,
and certainly far more than Germany.
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Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment in the Cause, A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71 at 68-69, available at http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd051208/aand-1.htm .
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constitutional norms. The Constitutional Court has indicated that it would not change its constitutional
standards in view of the anti-terrorism campaign and has in fact struck some laws that, in the view of the
Court, exceeded constitutional limits. So, for example, the law that enabled the government to shoot
down civilian aircraft that had been hijacked was deemed unconstitutional in its failure to protect the lives
of civilians.108 And the law that enabled the government to use electronic eavesdropping in houses was
also deemed unconstitutional because it had no way to exempt legally privileged communications from
being overheard.109

The European Arrest Warrant, rushed into existence after September 11, also ran

afoul of the Federal Constitutional Court’s understanding of proper rights protections.110 In general,
Germany has not departed from its normal constitutional procedures nor derogated from the European
Convention, as the UK has.111
As with the comparison of the US and Canada, in the comparison of the UK and Germany, it is
the country that had most firmly linked its domestic constitution to transnational practices and had firmly
entrenched international human rights in domestic law that resisted the slide into the use of emergency
powers.

All four countries changed their laws to comply with Resolution 1373, but the transnational

constitutionalist countries (Germany and Canada) kept within constitutional bounds more clearly than
those countries whose constitutions were the product of purely domestic influences (the US and the UK).

Chapter 6:
Varieties of Europe and the Wounds of Authoritarianism:
Spain and Russia112
Spain and Russia are worlds apart in many ways, but they share some crucial features that allow a
comparison of their counter-terrorism policies to be meaningful.

First, both have always been at the

108

For an official English-language summary of the case, see
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg06-011en.html . For the German judgment, see Judgment of
15. February 2006 – 1 BvR 357/05,
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215_1bvr035705.html .
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Judgment of 15 March 2004.
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For the official English-language summary of the case, see
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg05-064en.html .
111

This was written before the election in which Angela Merkel became Chancellor and needs to be revisited in light
of the new anti-terror policies passed since she came to power.
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The Russian part of this chapter was published as Kim Lane Scheppele, ’We Forgot About the Ditches:’ Russian
Constitutional Impatience and the Challenge of Terrorism. 53 DRAKE LAW REVIEW 963-1027 (2005).
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edges of Europe, with strong independent political traditions overtaken at crucial periods by nonEuropean empires. Both are complex federations of different peoples that speak different languages and
have different senses of their political histories and futures.

In the 20th century, both went through

periods of strong authoritarianism – Spain for about 40 years and Russia for about 70.

While Spain

emerged from authoritarianism in the 1970s, however, Russia emerged only in the 1990s. Spain’s
economic transition and development have been far smoother and more successful than Russia’s. Since
the political transition, however, both Russia and Spain have developed independent and sometimes
outspoken Constitutional Courts. Both have submitted themselves to the human rights discipline of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
But Spain is in the EU and no one thinks that Russia will ever join.
With respect to terrorism, Russia and Spain have had similar problems in their recent histories.
Both have fought off domestic terrorism from breakaway regions since they emerged as post-authoritarian
states.

In fact, both Spain’s and Russia’s current secessionist movements were incubated during the

authoritarian time by severe and targeted repression of both Basques and Catalans in Spain and Chechens,
Ingush and others in Russia.

As international terrorism has grown, both Spain and Russia have been

targets of Islamist-driven terrorist attacks. Still, both have faced significant daily threats from domestic
terrorist groups whose secessionist ambitions date from the severe repression under the prior authoritarian
regimes. With threats coming from two distinct directions (domestic and international), both Spain and
Russia entered the international anti-terrorism campaign with a great deal of prior experience and with
legal frameworks for combating terrorism already in place before September 11.

Since September 11,

however, both have suffered serious campaigns of terrorist attack in which the government has been
called upon to distinguish which attacks are caused by domestic groups and which by the international
ones.
Before September 11, Spain entered the world of transnational human rights protection, with a
strong Constitutional Court taking account of and elaborating the new transnational constitutional
jurisprudence. But Spain had also already aggressively fought terrorism, within a legal framework that
included special investigative magistrates to handle terrorism, a national court with unique jurisdiction
over terrorism and a strong tendency to bring terrorism suspects to trial in open court. Some of Spain’s
policies – for example the legal practice of incommunicado detention of terrorists – had come in for
international human rights criticism even before September 11. And some of the policies particularly of
Spain’s then-prime-minister Aznar were very tough on domestic terrorism, rounding up suspected
domestic terrorists in giant sweeps as well as banning the political parties and newspapers sympathetic to
Basque independence. Immediately after September 11, there were only a few changes in Spanish law
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(and then, mostly in the area of terrorism finance) because their counter-terrorism policies already
addressed many of the matters that the Security Council resolution called upon all states to address.
Before September 11, Russia had partially tied its domestic institutions to the first wave of public
law globalization. A new and aggressive Constitutional Court tried to keep the president within legal
bounds. As the world witnessed, however, President Yeltsin resisted such constraint and engineered a
limited civil war in which the parliament was bombed, the Constitutional Court was closed and a new
constitution giving the president extraordinary powers was pushed through in a suspicious referendum.113
Before September 11, the Russian state had used military methods to suppress drives for Chechen
independence and had not generally used the courts to address the matter. Nonetheless, some judicial
independence was able to emerge, along with striking revisions of constitutional criminal procedure and
general increases in the reach and reality of law, trends that accelerated quickly when President Putin
came to power. Before September 11, Russia showed serious signs of becoming a constitutional rule-oflaw state in ways that it had not been for much of its history.
Since September 11, however, both Spain and Russia have been hit with serious suicide
bombings in their core cities. The Madrid train bombing in March 2004 was traumatic and dramatic;
Russia has had multiple bombings of the Moscow metro system and a series of suicide bombers who
exploded themselves and caused casualties in central Moscow in 2003 and 2004. Plus Russia has had
mass hostage-takings in two hospitals in Southern Russia in the late 1990s, in a Moscow theater in 2002
and a school in the Caucasus in 2004, with heavy casualties of innocent civilians in all cases. The
reactions to these attacks in the two countries was quite different.
Spain, a country that embraced the first wave of public law globalization, had an election
immediately after the Madrid attack in which the population voted for a peaceful change of both
government and government policy in response to the terrorist attacks.

The new government softened its

policy against domestic separatist groups and has attempted to find a wider variety of methods for dealing
with the international terrorist threat. The Spanish government now finances the building of mosques and
the training of moderate religious leaders for these mosques, an approach to the anti-terrorism campaign
that eschews emergency powers in a particularly strong way.

The new government even offered a cease

fire and negotiations with the ETA Basque terrorist group.
In Russia, reaction of the state to its domestic terrorist attacks was primarily military, at first
cracking down in Chechnya while leaving the rest of domestic law relatively untouched. But after the
shocking siege of the school in Beslan in the Northern Caucacus, President Putin proposed to radically
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For a detailed account of the events of 1993 leading up to Yeltsin’s declaration of emergency powers, see Kim
Lane Scheppele, Guardians of the Constitution: Constitutional Court Presidents and the Struggle for the Rule of
Law in Post-Soviet Europe, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1757 (2006).
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change the structure of government to increase the “vertical of power” (which is to say, the ability of the
executive to control all levels of the state). He pushed through the Parliament laws that eliminated the
popular election of regional governors and changed the procedures for national election of representatives
to the lower house of the Russian parliament to eliminate single-member districts. There are also serious
discussions about authorizing state kidnappings of family members of terrorists to use as bargaining chips
in hostage negotiations.114 These moves are being justified as part of the anti-terrorism campaign. In
October 2004, Russia sought and got a resolution from the UN Security Council setting up a review
committee within the Security Council framework to consider expanding the set of internationally listed
terrorists to include those who may not be affiliated with either the Taliban or al Qaeda.

But it is clear

that participation in the anti-terrorism campaign has given President Putin more room for maneuver in his
own domestic space, centralizing power and using the threat of terrorism as a reason for curtaining
individual rights.
In the Russian/Spain comparison then, the state (Spain) that had tied its domestic constitutional
changes to transnational human rights models reacted in a much less extreme way than did the state
(Russia) that has always had an exceptionalist view of its own law.

In both cases, the states experienced

direct terrorist attacks after September 11 that could be tied to the international Islamist terrorist network.
But only in Russia’s case did it change its constitutional structure and general legal framework to crack
down on terrorists.

Chapter 7:
Traces of Empire: India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan were both, of course, part of the British Empire, governed through the same
Government of India acts and the same British colonial emergency laws until independence of both states
in 1948.

From the start of their lives as independent states, however, India and Pakistan took different

constitutional trajectories. India quickly adopted a constitution that has largely remained in force ever
since (with only one major long-term suspension for a national emergency, though it has had perennial
shorter and more local emergencies).

Pakistan, however, ran into constitutional troubles almost

immediately because repeated military coups and extensive constitutional revision has weakened the
constitutional order. Both India and Pakistan have similar legal systems and similar frames of legal
reference (with the high courts citing British and American precedent but not each other’s), but different

114

At the time of the Beslan siege in 2004, the Russian media reported that family members of the hostage-takers
had been detained in Chechyna in order to be used in the bargaining and negotiations over the release of hostages.
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experiences of emergency governance. In fact, the Pakistani Supreme Court has developed the most
sophisticated judicial theory of emergency powers that I am aware of – based on a Kelsenian theory of
revolutionary legality.

It is a jurisprudence of necessity; Pakistan has also had more military

governments and states of emergency than other most other still-constitutional regimes have had.

The

Indian Supreme Court, though also faced with a state of emergency in the 1970s, changed its
jurisprudence afterwards to more firmly accept the first wave of public law globalization, something that
the Pakistani court has not been able to do.
After September 11, both Pakistan and India adopted draconian new anti-terrorism laws. With
anti-Muslim agitation promoted by India’s then Hindu-nationalist government, the new Prevention of
Terrorism Act (POTA) was ripe for abuse. But then India, after an initial period of harsh treatment of
Muslims and of threatening to go to war with Pakistan over Kashmir, changed government in a surprising
election, and the new government has repealed the anti-terrorism law, reverting back to normal
governance.

India’s period of domestic exceptionalism in the name of terrorism was quite short after

September 11. As in Spain, peaceful elections in India changed the government’s direction in the postSeptember-11 anti-terrorism campaign.

Of course, major attacks on commuter trains in Mumbai in

summer 2006 may cause the government to change course. But so far, at least, there is no talk of bringing
back a new and harsh emergency law to handle terrorism.
Of course, the fact that September 11 occurred when Pakistan was being ruled by a military
governor in a state of exception didn’t help entrench constitutional governance at that point.

But

Musharraf had seized power in a popularly approved coup, and he had been in the midst of turning back
power in democratic elections when he got caught up in the global anti-terror campaign. Local elections
in fact took place after September 11. The reaction to the declaration of the Global War on Terror,
largely seen locally as the Global War against Muslims, could be seen as Islamist extremist governments
were elected for the first time in two of Pakistan’s four regions, something that had never come close to
occurring before. In previous elections, the Islamist share of the vote in national elections had never
before topped 10%. But September 11 – and the anti-terrorism campaign that followed – radicalized part
of the Muslim population, making it clear that national elections might not keep a secular constitutionalist
government in power. This may have been part of the reason why President Musharraf stopped talking at
that point about elections to the position of president.
For these domestic reasons, Pakistan has seen far greater changes in its constitutional order than
has India after September 11 and it appears to be falling more and more deeply into emergency as time
goes on.

In addition to enacting draconian new anti-terrorism laws since September 11, President

Musharraf has pushed through a series of constitutional amendments consolidating his power and
bringing the military overtly into the normal decision-making of the government for the first time. These
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changes go well beyond the anti-terrorism campaign and have changed the basic structure of Pakistani
constitutional governance.

Under international (particularly American) pressure, Musharraf has used

harsh measures to bring the tribal lands under federal control, has set the security services loose to engage
in domestic surveillance and has used harsh tactics to apprehend and interrogate terrorism suspects.115
The democratic elections that Musharraf had promised before September 11 to bring the government out
of emergency into normal governance are nowhere in sight.
Here, too, in considering two countries with similar histories until the post-war period, we find
that the country that joined the international constitutional order resisted outsided emergency powers,
even when clearly provoked by domestic terrorist attacks.

India has managed to resist panic and

maintain normal criminal investigation methods for fighting terrorism, with some success. Pakistan, by
contrast, fell more completely into dictatorial rule, outsized emergency measures and flaunting of the rule
of law.

115

As I write (September 2006), an agreement has apparently been reached between the center and the tribal lands in
which remnants of the Taliban have apparently been regrouping and where Osama bin Laden is, by general
agreement of international security services, hiding. The Pakistani government agreed to withdraw the national
military if the tribal lands agree that they will police against fundamentalist foreigners putting down roots in their
midst. Whether the US or the Security Council will tolerate this agreement remains to be seen.
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Part III: Conclusions
(This is the part that is least developed, because it will come last in the writing. I am torn
between trying to develop a normative theory of emergency powers that specifies a proper relationship
between international and domestic law [see the sketchy attempt below] and a more empirically based
concluding chapter that summarizes the argument and evidence developed in the book to this point. All
advice appreciated on which way to go.)

Chapter 8:
A Normative Theory of the International State of Emergency (ISOE)

Given that we now know that international law can undermine both human rights protection and
constitutional structures, we need to return to the field of normative theory, where theories of emergency
powers have largely been based. But rather than provide a domestic-law-only theory that indicates when
the use of emergency powers is justifiable, we need to identify instead a proper relationship between
international and domestic law.

What parts of international law should countries absorb and what parts

of international law should countries be wary of accepting without controls?

More particularly, when

should domestic constitutions trump international law and when should international law trump domestic
constitutions?
In this chapter, I develop a normative theory of the relationship between domestic and
transnational law that enables states to resist transnational pressures to use emergency powers. I argue
that the development of a particular and strong form of constitutionalism since World War II has provided
(and should provide) a set of domestically enforceable constraints on what states (or more precisely, their
executives) can do to comply with international mandates.

Rather than seeing international law as

always superior or always inferior to domestic law, then, I argue that this new constitutionalism can act as
a screening mechanism for determining when transnational norms can be domestically deployed.

One

does not then have to mechanically choose between monism (the view that international law is
automatically part of domestic law) and dualism (the view that international law needs a separate
domestic law enactment to become part of domestic law) to specify the relationship between international
and domestic law. In fact, that is probably the wrong dimension altogether along which to think the
proper links.
If the domestic constitutional framework provides a legal basis for the realization of certain
normative criteria (roughly speaking, entrenching the post-war constitutional model that values separation
of powers, due process and human rights), then it should be the relevant normative standard for assessing
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when international norms should be locally adopted.

In short, I argue that certain forms of domestic

constitutionalism can and should provide a normative check on the applicability of this new form of
international public law.

Of course, this particularly strong form of domestic constitutionalism has

international roots and a transnational support network, so I am not advocating localism against
internationalism.

Instead, I am advocating that a particular kind of transnationally infused local

constitutionalism can serve as the normative baseline against which international security campaigns can
be evaluated.
In many ways, my argument generalizes from the experience of Germany within the European
Union. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has tried to provide locally invariant standards for
the absorption of transnational European legal norms. So, for example, the Constitutional Court has
provided guidelines that transnational European law would have to follow in order for it to be consistent
with the German constitutional order, which itself still provides the ultimate check.

This sort of

relationship – where local constitutionalist norms provide a filter through which transnational norms pass
before they can be absorbed domestically – might serve as a model for what constitutionalist domestic
legal systems can do when confronted with the challenge of international security law. Strong domestic
constitutional can absorb the best of international law while being wary of its dark side. But not just any
constitutionalist order can do this.
I argue, based on the case studies in Part II of this book, that simply having a relatively strong
constitutional order is not alone enough. The constitutional orders that place human dignity at their core
and that develop a system of rights and protections emanating out from this core are both empirically
more likely to withstand the challenges and normatively more likely to produce better results.
Exceptionalist constitutionalist orders, those that find their norms and values only within their own
histories, are much more vulnerable to the lure of emergency powers and much less likely to notice their
own slides into practices unworthy of their imagined histories.

Scheppele – draft September 2006

73

International State of Emergency

Appendix A:

Resolution 1373 (2001)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting, on
28 September 2001
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1269 (1999) of 19 October 1999 and 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001,
Reaffirming also its unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York,
Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its determination to prevent
all such acts,
Reaffirming further that such acts, like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to
international peace and security,
Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the
United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001), Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts,
Deeply concerned by the increase, in various regions of the world, of acts of terrorism motivated by
intolerance or extremism,
Calling on States to work together urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including through
increased cooperation and full implementation of the relevant international conventions relating to
terrorism,
Recognizing the need for States to complement international cooperation by taking additional measures to
prevent and suppress, in their territories through all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any
acts of terrorism,
Reaffirming the principle established by the General Assembly in its declaration of October 1970
(resolution 2625 (XXV)) and reiterated by the Security Council in its resolution 1189 (1998) of 13
August 1998, namely that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory
directed towards the commission of such acts,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that all States shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
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(b) Criminalize the willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their
nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that
they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit,
or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on
behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from
property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making any funds,
financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available, directly or
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the
commission of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and of
persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such persons;
2. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in
terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the
supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early
warning to other States by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective
territories for those purposes against other States or their citizens;
(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of
terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other
measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws
and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts;
(f) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or
criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in obtaining
evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings;
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on
issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting,
forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel documents;
3. Calls upon all States to:
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(a) Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially
regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents;
traffic in arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications technologies by terrorist groups;
and the threat posed by the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups;
(b) Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law and cooperate on
administrative and judicial matters to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;
(c) Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and
suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts;
(d) Become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to
terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9
December 1999;
(e) Increase cooperation and fully implement the relevant international conventions and protocols relating
to terrorism and Security Council resolutions 1269 (1999) and 1368 (2001);
(f) Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international
law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of
ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist
acts;
(g) Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators,
organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as
grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists;
4. Notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized
crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear,
chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to
enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to
strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security;
5. Declares that acts, methods, and practices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations and that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations;
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of
the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this
resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls upon all States to report to the
Committee, no later than 90 days from the date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a
timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have taken to implement this resolution;
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7. Directs the Committee to delineate its tasks, submit a work programme within 30 days of the adoption
of this resolution, and to consider the support it requires, in consultation with the Secretary-General;
8. Expresses its determination to take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this
resolution, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter;
9. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

